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Burning Crosses on Campus:                             
University Hate Speech Codes 
ALEXANDER TSESIS 
Debates about the value and constitutionality of hate speech regulations on 
college campuses have deeply divided academics for over a decade.  The Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Virginia v. Black, recognizing a state’s power to criminalize 
intentionally intimidating cross burning at long last provides the key to resolving this 
heated dispute.  The opponents of hate speech codes argue that such regulation guts 
our concept of free speech.  One prominent scholar claims that this censorship would 
nullify the First Amendment and have “totalitarian implications.”  Another 
constitutional expert, Erwin Chemerinsky, asserts that the “public university simply 
cannot prohibit the expression of hate, including antisemitism, without running afoul 
of [established First Amendment principles].” 
On the other end of the spectrum are authors who argue that hate speech attacks 
individuals’ Fourteenth Amendment right to equality, which outweighs any cathartic 
desire to degrade people because of their race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and 
religion. This line of thinking recognizes the fundamental right to free speech but 
argues that it can be restrained when used to intrude on others’ dignity rights.  The 
advocates of campus hate speech codes claim that a college’s mission to further 
intellectual freedom is not undermined by restricting intimidating speech on campus; 
consequently, some scholars argue that curbing racist and xenophobic speech would 
not undermine the core purpose of higher education—the acquisition of truth. 
Both factions have relied on the Supreme Court’s First Amendment precedents to 
bolster their claims.  This Article adds a fresh perspective to this decades-old 
academic tempest of intellectual disagreement about First Amendment theory.  It first 
discusses the current problem of hate speech on college campuses.  It then turns to a 
survey of First Amendment jurisprudence that is relevant to the regulation of hate 
speech on campus.  Then it compares and contrasts international approaches to that of 
the United States.  The final portion of the Article analyzes the narrow and broad 
implications of the Supreme Court’s rational in Virginia v. Black to develop two forms 
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Burning Crosses on Campus:  
University Hate Speech Codes 
ALEXANDER TSESIS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most divisive First Amendment debates of the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries has been about the constitutionality of 
university hate speech regulations.  The Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Virginia v. Black,1 recognizing a state’s power to criminalize 
intentionally intimidating cross burning,2 provides the key to resolving this 
heated dispute.  The opponents of hate speech codes argue that their 
enforcement contravenes the American commitment to the preservation of 
free speech.3  One prominent scholar claims that this censorship would 
nullify the First Amendment and have “totalitarian implications.”4  
Another constitutional expert, Erwin Chemerinsky, asserts that the “public 
university simply cannot prohibit the expression of hate, including 
antisemitism, without running afoul of [established First Amendment 
principles].”5 
On the other end of the spectrum are authors who argue that hate 
speech attacks individuals’ Fourteenth Amendment right to equality, which 
outweighs any cathartic desire to degrade people because of their race, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, or nationality.6  This line of thinking 
recognizes the fundamental right to free speech but argues that it can be 
                                                                                                                          
* Loyola University School of Law, Chicago.  I am indebted to William M. Carter, Jr., Jessie 
Hill, Darrell A.H. Miller, Robert A. Kahn, Josh Rubin, and Nathan R. Sellers for comments on an 
earlier draft. 
1 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
2 Id. at 363. 
3 Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13 CONST. 
COMMENT. 71, 73 (1996). 
4 David E. Bernstein, Defending the First Amendment from Antidiscrimination Laws, 82 N.C. L. 
REV. 223, 240–41 (2003). 
5 Erwin Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech on Campus, Even Hate Speech, Is a First Amendment 
Issue, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 770 (2009) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech]. 
6 See Onder Bakircioglu, Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech, 16 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
1, 18 (2008) (“[T]he state . . . has a responsibility to diminish the conditions that create inequality. . . .  
The protection of hate speech hence might at times conflict with the right to equality . . . .”); Thomas P. 
Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of “Place” in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2587, 2613 (2007) (noting that the meaning of particular speech has mattered in debate over 
speech regulations); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in 
Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 383–87 (1991) (discussing the harmful effects of racist speech). 
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restrained when used to intrude on others’ dignity rights.7  The advocates 
of campus hate speech codes claim that their aims are not novel.  They are 
construed as a balancing of interests that is already commonplace with 
other limitations on speech, such as those enforced through copyright, 
libel, conspiracy, and fighting words statutes.8  A college’s mission to 
further intellectual freedom is unimpaired by limitations on intimidating 
campus expression; consequently, some scholars argue that curbing racist 
and xenophobic speech would not undermine the core purpose of higher 
education, the acquisition of truth.9  This school of thought holds either 
that hate speech is outside the scope of the First Amendment or 
counterbalanced by weightier social considerations.10 
Both factions have relied on the Supreme Court’s free speech 
jurisprudence to bolster their claims.  Opponents of university hate speech 
regulations have often relied on R.A.V. v. St. Paul,11 in which the majority 
found a municipal ordinance against cross burning to be unconstitutional.12  
Following the rationale of that case, libertarians and several lower federal 
courts have asserted that university administrators lack the authority to 
prevent the spread of vitriol, no matter how racist, xenophobic, or sexist.13  
Eleven years after deciding R.A.V., in a quiet coup, the Court upheld a 
more rigorously drafted cross burning statute than the one struck down in 
R.A.V.  The later decision, Virginia v. Black,14 defined the scope of 
legitimate limitations on destructive messages.  Given its substantial 
                                                                                                                          
7 Steven J. Heyman, Hate Speech, Public Discourse, and the First Amendment, in EXTREME 
SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 158, 160, 163 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009). 
8 Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of 
Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 871, 883, 892 (1994). 
9 Richard A. Glenn & Otis H. Stephens, Campus Hate Speech and Equal Protection: Competing 
Constitutional Values, 6 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 349, 363 (1997). 
10 See id. at 362–63 (“This type of speech feeds prejudice and may be undeserving of First 
Amendment protection.  Hate speech is subject to limitation if the intent of the speaker is not to 
advance or acquire knowledge, but rather to injure and destroy the victim.”).  
11 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
12 Id. at 391. 
13 This Article proposes a more narrowly constructed hate speech code than the ones struck in 
lower court decisions.  Those district and circuit court cases were issued long before Virginia v. Black, 
which is the Supreme Court decision I primarily rely on to develop a campus incitement plan.  The 
most commonly cited of these earlier cases, Doe v. University of Michigan, was decided at the district 
court level.  721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).  The case involved a University of Michigan code 
prohibiting “individuals, under the penalty of sanctions, from ‘stigmatizing or victimizing’ individuals 
or groups on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, 
ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status.”  Id. at 853.  Michigan had 
instituted the anti-harassment policy as part of its effort to deal with the increased frequency of racist 
incidents on campus.  Id. at 854–55.  The court held that enforcement of such a “vague” policy would 
violate the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 867.  Another much discussed federal district court case held that 
the University of Wisconsin’s hate speech code was likewise unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.  
UMW Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1178–79 (E.D. Wis. 
1991).  Because these decisions were not binding precedents, many colleges outside the courts’ 
jurisdictions retained their codes.  JON B. GOULD, SPEAK NO EVIL: THE TRIUMPH OF HATE SPEECH 
REGULATION 159 (2005). 
14 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
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impact on First Amendment jurisprudence, it has received surprisingly 
inadequate treatment in the academic literature.  I extend the Supreme 
Court’s rationale to hate speech that can intimidate minority groups as well 
as individuals—a controversial point, to say the least, since so many 
specialists erroneously believe group defamation is no longer actionable.  
My point, however, is that college hate speech codes serve a public good 
by preventing the dissemination of menacing stereotypes, symbols, and 
statements that deter people from enjoying the intellectual life of a 
university.  Universities can limit hate speech that aims to stifle 
conversation by putting members of the campus community in fear for 
their well-being. 
This Article adds a fresh perspective to this decades-old academic 
tempest of intellectual disagreement about First Amendment theory.  It 
first discusses the current problem of hate speech on college campuses.  It 
then turns to a survey of First Amendment jurisprudence that is relevant to 
the regulation of hate speech on campus.  Then it provides a comparative 
analysis of international and European regulations of hate speech, 
comparing and contrasting international approaches to that of the United 
States.  That analysis lays the groundwork for developing hate speech 
codes that are informed by international norms without violating the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.  The final portion of the Article 
analyzes the narrow and broad implications of the Supreme Court’s 
rationale in Black to develop two forms of college hate speech regulations 
that are likely to withstand First Amendment challenges. 
II.  HATE SPEECH ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES 
Numerous incidents of hate speech have occurred on American college 
campuses.  Their increased frequency speaks to the need to develop 
constitutionally sound campus hate speech codes designed to prevent the 
alienation and intimidation of targeted students.  Before delving into what 
forms of speech colleges can constitutionally restrict, this section provides 
sociological background indicating the extent of the problem. 
There are strong differences of opinion as to what constitutes hate 
speech.  For example, when Columbia University invited Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to speak on campus, many elected and private 
individuals decried the decision to provide a forum for a well-known 
denier of the Holocaust and supporter of terror.15  Others, to the contrary, 
                                                                                                                          
15 See Amotz Asa-El, Editorial, Value of Free Speech Twisted at Columbia, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 3, 2007, at B6 (stating that Ahmadinejad is a “narrow-minded populist” who is 
“tactless” and “intellectual[ly] limit[ed]”); Barbara Banaian, Op-Ed., President’s Speech Had No 
Purpose, ST. CLOUD TIMES (Minn.), Oct. 5, 2007, at 4B (arguing that Ahmadinejad’s speech served no 
educational purpose); Irwin Cotler, Op-Ed., Ahmadinejad and International Law, JERUSALEM POST, 
Oct. 3, 2007, at 15 (arguing that Ahmadinejad should not have been given a forum to speak because of 
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regarded his appearance there to be a legitimate part of the university’s 
educational mission because it provided an opportunity to voice 
differences of opinion.16 
Hate speech that is overtly derogatory toward vulnerable groups 
persistently occurs on college campuses.  Jewish students at several U.S. 
universities have recently been the targets of a growing number of 
antisemitic incidents.17  An Anti-Defamation League audit found there 
were ninety-four antisemitic incidents on U.S. campuses in 2007, 
representing about six percent of total anti-Jewish harassment and 
vandalism that year.18  This frequency speaks to the need to develop 
constitutionally sound campus hate speech codes designed to prevent the 
alienation and intimidation of targeted students. 
Jewish students at the University of California, Irvine (“UC-Irvine”) 
report that antagonism has grown to such an extent that they travel the 
outskirts of campus to avoid conflict, are reluctant to engage in activities 
sponsored by Jewish organizations, and have trouble focusing on their 
studies.19  Imam Mohammad Al-Asi and Amir Abdel Malik Ali made 
speeches at a week-long event at UC-Irvine that wedded traditional 
stereotypes with modern events, claiming that Jews are in control of U.S. 
media and responsible for the terror on September 11, 2001.  In one speech 
Al-Asi asserted, “‘[w]e have a psychosis in the Jewish community that is 
unable to co-exist equally and brotherly with other human beings.’”20  In 
2010, the Muslim Student Union at UC-Irvine, which the University 
subsequently banned, brought in a speaker who “compared Jews to Nazis” 
and “expressed support for Hamas, Hizbullah and Islamic Jihad.”21 
                                                                                                                          
his alleged incitement to genocide); Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at Columbia, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 
(D.C.), Oct. 5, 2007, at 4 (surveying a variety of views on Ahmadinejad’s invitation to Columbia 
University and Columbia President Lee Bollinger’s criticism of the Iranian president); Rep. Calvert 
Denounces President Ahmadinejad’s Visit to U.S., U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 28, 2007 (“There is great 
irony that Ahmadinejad, who has openly called America ‘[t]he Great Satan’ and threatened to wipe one 
of our allies ‘off the map,’ is allowed to speak freely without fear of repercussion.”). 
16 See, e.g., Sheryl McCarthy, Editorial, “Madman” Tag Is Counterproductive, AUGUSTA CHRON. 
(Ga.), Oct. 4, 2007, at A05 (criticizing the actions of Columbia’s president for being 
“counterproductive” and “insult[ing]” to Ahmadinejad); Zohreh Rastegar, The Belligerent Lee 
Bollinger, NEWSRELEASEWIRE.COM, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://expertclick.com/NewsRelease 
Wire/ReleaseDetails.aspx?ID=18157&CFID=154679&CFTOKEN=81626502 (arguing it was not the 
Iranian President’s but President Bollinger’s speech that was offensive); Jonathan Zimmerman, Hate 
Acts, Hate Words Bear Great Distinction, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), Sept. 30, 2007, 
at G04 (stating that the best way to disseminate knowledge is through different points of view). 
17 Susan B. Tuchman, Jewish Students of America, Know Your Legal Rights, JERUSALEM POST, 
(Dec. 11, 2005), http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=7091. 
18 Sonia Scherr, Anti-Semitism Goes to School, INTELLIGENCE REP., Fall 2008, at 19, 19, 
available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2008/fall/anti-
semitism-goes-to-school. 
19 Tuchman, supra note 17. 
20 Scherr, supra note 18, at 20. 
21 E.B. Solomont, Irvine Muslim Student Union Suspended, JERUSALEM POST, (June 15, 2010), 
http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=178434. 
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In two separate incidents at the University of California, Berkeley 
(“UC-Berkeley”), swastikas were scrawled on a Jewish student 
organization’s pamphlet and an anti-Palestinian message appeared 
scrawled on a campus building.22  At the California Polytechnic 
University, students reported seeing a Confederate flag and a noose 
hanging in a residence hall, as well as a sign featuring racist and 
homophobic statements.23  University attorneys and law enforcement 
officials presumed, incorrectly as I will demonstrate later, that the First 
Amendment protects such speech.24  In light of their advice, the president 
of the university issued a written reprimand but refused to punish the 
perpetrators.25  In Eugene, Oregon, several “hate speech-related crime[s]” 
followed the appearances of Holocaust denier David Irving and Ku Klux 
Klan supporter Tomislav Sunic at group-sponsored forums held on the 
University of Oregon campus.26 
Universities and policymakers have drafted, or have considered 
drafting, a variety of responses to these types of incidents.  The University 
of Nevada, Las Vegas (“UNLV”) is considering instituting a campus hate 
crime policy that would include a prohibition against expressions 
                                                                                                                          
22 Hate Speech Roils UC Berkeley Campus, N.Y. JEWISH WEEK, Sept. 26, 2008, at 50; see also 
Rebecca Wallace, UC-Berkeley: U California Berkeley Groups React to Recent Acts of “Hate Speech” 
Vandalism, DAILY CALIFORNIAN, Sept. 24, 2008, available at http://www.dailycal.org/article/ 
102745/campus_groups_react_to_recent_acts_of_hate_speech (reporting incidents of antisemitic and 
retaliatory vandalism on UC-Berkeley’s campus).  
23 Nick Wilson, Confronting Signs of Hate, TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo, Cal.), Nov. 7, 2008, at 
A1; see also Johnna Pinholster, Community Discussion Tackles Southern Heritage, Symbolism, 
VALDOSTA DAILY TIMES (Ga.), Sept. 28, 2009, available at http://www.valdostadailytimes.com/ 
archivesearch/local_story_271232024.html (relating a public discussion at Valdosta State University 
about polarizing symbols like Confederate flags on campus); Alex Vaughn, Professors Give Historic 
Perspective, TECHNICIAN (N.C. State Univ.) (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.technicianonline.com/news/ 
professors-give-historic-perspective-1.1042145 (reporting on a prospective teach-in about hate images, 
such as the Confederate flag, lynching, and the Ku Klux Klan, scrawled in the school’s “Free 
Expression Tunnel”). 
24 Nick Wilson, Incident at Cal Poly: Hundreds Urge Tolerance over Display of Hate Signs, 
TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo, Cal.), Nov. 13, 2008, at A1.  See infra Part II.B for a discussion of why the 
First Amendment does not protect hate speech. 
25 Press Release, Cal. Polytechnic State Univ., Cal Poly President Issues Second Letter to Campus 
Supporting Diversity, Announcing University Meetings, Nov. 4, 2008, available at 
http://calpolynews.calpoly.edu/news_releases/2008/November/Baker-message.html. 
26 Jack Moran, Hate-Filled Graffiti Spurs Vigil, Concerns, REG.-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), June 24, 
2008, at A.  Concerning David Irving’s Holocaust denial, see ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE 
MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 188 (2002) 
[hereinafter TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES].  The best full-length account of the David Irving trial in 
Germany is RICHARD J. EVANS, LYING ABOUT HITLER: HISTORY, HOLOCAUST, AND THE DAVID 
IRVING TRIAL 185–266 (2001).  Irving sued Penguin Books and Professor Deborah Lipstadt for 
allegedly libeling him as a Nazi apologist and Holocaust denier.  The High Court held that Irving was 
both a Holocaust denier and antisemitic.  Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., [2000] EWHC (Civ) 115, 
13.91–13.108 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2000/115.html.  A 
Vienna Court later sentenced Irving to three years in jail.  Anne Applebaum, Tolerating the Intolerable, 
BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 2, 2006, at A7.  Irving, though, only served one year of the sentence behind bars.  
Luke Salkeld, Riot Fear After Oxford Invites BNP to Debate, DAILY MAIL (London), Nov. 26, 2007, at 
20. 
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motivated by racial, religious, gender, and political bias.27  In the spring of 
2009, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission held an open public forum 
for better understanding the testimonies of student victims of hate speech 
and balancing them against others’ free speech concerns.28  At the 
University of Rhode Island, the provost, Donald H. DeHayes, supported a 
university police investigation of hateful, racist epithets made against then 
presidential candidate Barack Obama.29  And at Auburn University, the 
multicultural center suggested sponsoring an event on hate speech after a 
professor received a racist note.30 
Other universities have instituted aspirational civility statements for 
preventing the use of prejudicial slurs.31  The University of Chicago, for 
instance, requests that its community foster the marketplace of ideas by 
preserving the diversity, civility, and equality of its campus.32  St. 
Scholastica College in Duluth, Minnesota, issued a similar statement to 
students after hate symbols appeared on its campus, as did two other 
colleges in the state.33 
Some of these incidents of hate speech have been isolated events.  
Others appeared to be part of a concerted effort to make certain groups feel 
uncomfortable, threatened, or isolated.  The location of these events, often 
occurring hundreds or even thousands of miles from each other, suggests 
that the expression of intimidating bigotry is not a localized problem.  But 
can anything be done to combat this trend?  Are all or any of the recent 
expressions of hate on campus protected by the First Amendment?  Indeed, 
only constitutional solutions are warranted.  Mere discomfort or disdain is 
no justification for diminishing an individual’s right of self-expression, no 
matter how morally reprehensible the message might be.  Free speech 
jurisprudence shows that universities do not have a free hand when it 
comes to regulating hate speech, but they are not without recourse when 
destructive messages intentionally incite criminal behavior against 
identifiable groups. 
                                                                                                                          
27 Controlling Speech UNLV Policy Goes Too Far in Trying To Stop Harassment, Treads on the 
First Amendment, LAS VEGAS SUN, Apr. 28, 2009, at 4.  The most recently reported UNLV draft policy 
on hate crimes contains a provision against intimidation and harassment.  Richard Lake, UNLV 
Rewrites Policy on Hate Crimes, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 3, 2009, at 2B. 
28 Press Release, Mich. Dep’t of Civil Rights, Michigan Civil Rights Commission Seeks Student 
Victims of Campus Hate for Testimony (Mar. 27, 2008), http://michigan.gov/mdcr/0,1607,7-138-
4952_4995-188497--,00.html.  A similar public forum was held in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, to 
discuss the issue of hate crimes and hate speech policy for public universities.  Eric Ferreri, UNC 
Commission Hears Pleas To Create Hate-Crimes Policy, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 16, 
2009, at B2. 
29 Kate Bramson, URI Probes Hate Speech Messages, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 24, 2008, at 2. 
30 Hannah Wolfson, Auburn Professor Reports Racist Note, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Oct. 22, 2008, 
at 6B. 
31 Marilyn Gilroy, Colleges Grappling with Incivility, 18 HISP. OUTLOOK IN HIGHER ED. 8 (2008), 
reprinted in 74 EDUC. DIG. 36, 37 (2008). 
32 Id. 
33 Duluth College Reaffirms Hate Crime Policy, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 28, 2008, at B2. 
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III.  U.S. JURISPRUDENCE 
College administrators have taken several approaches in response to 
recent expressions of hatred at American universities.34  Inevitably, each 
university is a self-governing body that sets its own policies.  In 
developing approaches uniquely designed to combat hate speech at their 
separate universities, all administrators must be conscious not to infringe 
on individuals’ First Amendment rights. 
A.  Foundations of First Amendment Law 
Supreme Court jurisprudence establishes the extent to which the state 
can impose limitations on expression.  While speech is among the foremost 
of individual rights, states can prohibit a limited class of expressions that 
are harmful to individuals’ reputational, property, and dignitary interests.35 
Contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence developed in the early 
twentieth century.36  Three of the most prominent cases arose with the 
prosecution of defendants under the Espionage Act of 1917.37  The most 
often cited of the three, Schenck v. United States, affirmed the conviction 
of a socialist who conspired to distribute leaflets against forced military 
conscription during World War I.38  Writing for the majority, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes recognized that the government suppression of statements 
against the war involved more than ordinary criminal issues.39  The Court 
upheld prosecution under the law but developed a test to prevent 
government overreaching to suppress protected speech.  Federal and state 
statutes could only prevent the freedom of expression when the message 
posed “a clear and present danger” of achieving some “substantive evil[]” 
that the government “has a right to prevent.”40  This test allowed for the 
proscription of speech when it was likely to soon cause criminal conduct, 
                                                                                                                          
34 See supra text accompanying notes 27–33. 
35 See Alexander Tsesis, Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 389, 394–95 
(2004) (noting that “[c]ontemporary jurisprudence recognizes the constitutionality of laws” restricting 
speech that is harmful to these interests). 
36 For a history of free speech in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, see generally DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS, 1870–1920 
(1997).  Stephen M. Feldman has also published a detail-rich historical narrative on this subject, FREE 
EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2008). 
37 See Act of June 15, 1917, Pub L. No. 65-24, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (amended 1997) 
(punishing the expression of sentiments that undermine war efforts).  The three cases are: Debs v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); and Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).  For early criticism of the Espionage Act, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 
Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 973 (1919).  A significantly more deferential 
contemporary approach to the restrictions on wartime speech is found in Edward S. Corwin, Freedom 
of Speech and Press Under the First Amendment: A Resumé, 30 YALE L.J. 48, 55 (1920). 
38 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49–50, 53. 
39 Id. at 52. 
40 Id.  
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such as violence, but not when the message itself was obnoxious.41 
While Shenck appears to establish a “clear and present danger” rule, no 
one case could by itself develop the foundations of First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Just seven days after it decided Schenck, in a closely related 
case, Frohwerk v. United States, the Court upheld a ten-year prison 
sentence against a German-born newspaper editor for attempting to cause 
“disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military” during the First 
World War.42  At his sentencing hearing, the defendant dejectedly declared 
his loyalty to the United States and his hatred for “kaizerism”; in turn, the 
trial judge expressed his respect for German culture.43  Once again writing 
for the majority, Holmes recognized that the First Amendment “obviously 
was not[] intended to give immunity for every possible use of language.”44  
His rationale reflected on the particular circumstances of publication 
leading to the defendant’s harsh conviction, finding that the newspaper was 
circulated in areas “where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame 
and that the fact was known and relied upon by those who sent the paper 
out.”45  While it is highly improbable that an appeal from any prosecution 
of criticism against the current War on Terror would find so sympathetic a 
Court, nothing indicates that the principle of Frohwerk has been overruled.  
The opinion established government’s ability to criminalize advocacy to 
commit criminal acts in circumstances that pose a clear and present danger 
of serious harm, but it did not grant government a license to impede 
criticism of the war, even during the course of belligerency.  What remains 
is the principle that, where language instigates violence or threatens 
violence, it can be regulated without violating the speakers’ First 
                                                                                                                          
41 Judge Learned Hand further elaborated the test: “In each case [courts] must ask whether the 
gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is 
necessary to avoid the danger.”  United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 
U.S. 494 (1951).  As with so many of Judge Learned Hand’s articulations, the significance of this one 
went well beyond the Second Circuit.  The Supreme Court has accepted the passage several times both 
in its rulings and in dicta.  E.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976); Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 453 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 
64 (1961); Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510. 
42 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 205–06, 210.  The Missouri state case is unreported in Westlaw and 
Lexis, but details about it appear at 12 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS xxix-xxx (John D. Lawson ed., 1919).  
Jacob Frohwerk was the president of the Kansas branch of the National German-American Alliance.  In 
his testimony before a United States Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, he stated that 
neither he nor the organization had any connection or received any money from the German 
government.  National German-American Alliance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary on S. 3529, 65th Cong. 199 (1918) (testimony of Jacob Frohwerk, President, National 
German-American Alliance—State Alliance of Kansas).  The Senate Subcommittee grilled Frohwerk 
about his organization’s political activism against the export of munitions during World War I.  Id. at 
200.  Frohwerk was an editor of The Missouri Staats Zeitung, which published editorials against 
performing military service.  Two Missouri Editors Held, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1918, at 7.   
43 Frohwerk Gets Ten Years, CHILLICOTHE CONSTITUTION (Mo.), July 1, 1918, at 3; see also 
German Editors Arrested, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1918, at 6.   
44 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 206. 
45 Id. at 209. 
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Amendment rights.  The reason for this leeway in the regulation of 
dangerous speech is that it does not further the underlying rationale for free 
speech.  Intimidation is neither a step toward truth in the marketplace of 
ideas nor related to democratic self-governance. 
In the final case of this trilogy, Debs v. United States, which also 
upheld a conviction for seeking to incite insubordination of the military,46 
the Court inferred the speaker’s advocacy from his choice of words, which 
tended “to obstruct the recruiting service.”47  The significance of the ruling 
lies in the judicial power to assess whether speech has the “natural 
tendency and reasonably probable effect” of convincing audiences to 
commit illegal acts.48  Taken together, the doctrine announced in Schenck, 
Frohwerk, and Debs allows for the use of circumstantial evidence to prove 
the clear and present danger of harm from speech. 
These precedents established that government can prohibit speech 
whose content and context tends to cause a clear and present danger that 
likely will trigger serious illegal acts.  While Holmes later tempered this 
principle by making it only applicable to extreme cases, these three rulings 
remain pivotal to First Amendment jurisprudence.  His dissent in Abrams 
v. United States49 qualified his earlier opinions, and demonstrated a 
heightened sensitivity to the dangers of suppressing ideas that are unrelated 
to harmful incitement.50  Most critically, Holmes’s dissent in Abrams 
provided a more stringent test to prevent the judiciary’s zealous over-
support for executive department wartime action that had led to the arrest 
and conviction of men who had merely expressed opposition to World War 
I. 
Abrams was one of five Russian-born anarchists convicted for urging 
munitions workers to go on strike in opposition to “barbaric intervention” 
                                                                                                                          
46 249 U.S. 211, 212, 217 (1919). 
47 Id. at 216.  Eugene V. Debs, the subject of prosecution in this case was a socialist leader who 
became famous for his efforts on behalf of working people and his unsuccessful runs for the United 
States presidency.  NICK SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND SOCIALIST 342–45 (1984).  Debs 
argued that the military draft was a capitalist plan to conscript working men against their class interests.  
ERNEST FREEBERG, DEMOCRACY’S PRISONER: EUGENE V. DEBS, THE GREAT WAR, AND THE RIGHT TO 
DISSENT 45, 55 (2008).  He was convicted for violating the Espionage Act of 1917.  GEOFFREY R. 
STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR 
ON TERRORISM 196–97 (2004).  After Debs was jailed, President Harding commuted his sentence and 
invited him for a private conversation at the White House.  JOHN W. DEAN, WARREN G. HARDING 128 
(2004).   
48 Debs, 249 U.S. at 216. 
49 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
50 Id. at 630–31.  For a list of diverging opinions about whether Holmes’s views on the First 
Amendment changed between Schenck and Abrams, see Stephen M. Feldman, Free Speech, World War 
I, and Republican Democracy: The Internal and External Holmes, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 192, 194 
n.7 (2008).  The Holmes dissent in Abrams has been variously regarded as a change in his thinking, an 
inconsistency in his First Amendment approach, or a response to legislative developments.  Thomas A. 
Balmer, “Present Appreciation and Future Advantage”: A Note on the Influence of Hobbes and 
Holmes, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 412, 430 (2005). 
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of the United States into the Russian Civil War between the Bolsheviks 
and the White Armies.51  Abrams was part of a group of anarchist and 
socialist immigrants from Russia who wrote, printed, and distributed 
leaflets urging opposition to U.S. policy.52  The three principal organizers 
were sentenced to twenty years in prison, and another received a fifteen-
year sentence.53  The Court gave little explanation for upholding the 
convictions except to say that it was following Schenck and Frohwerk.54 
While the majority’s analysis is not particularly memorable, Holmes’s 
dissent has had an enormous influence on the evolution of free speech 
doctrine.  Holmes opposed the conviction because he regarded it to be an 
impermissible suppression of relatively innocuous political ideas; the state, 
he wrote, can only legitimately restrict speech that poses “the present 
danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about.”55  Abrams posed 
no immediate danger since he had no specific intent to overthrow the 
government.  The harsh prison sentence, as Holmes saw it, was imposed to 
prevent Abrams from expressing personal views supporting the newly 
installed Soviet government.56  Of even greater consequence than his 
exposition of the case, was Holmes’s philosophy of free speech.  Known as 
the “marketplace of ideas” doctrine, it posits that “the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely 
can be carried out.”57  
This doctrinal formulation raises very complex questions of 
construction; perhaps the most complicated ones are how a judge is to 
determine what the nature of “truth” is and the extent to which the First 
Amendment protects unenlightening expressions.  Surely truth-seeking is 
not the entire range of constitutionally protected speech.  The First 
                                                                                                                          
51 SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 329–30 
(1989); see also Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From the 
Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 845 (2008) (noting 
that “American military intervention on behalf of the White armies fighting Russian Bolsheviks” was 
the target of the defendants’ activities). 
52 MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL 
LIBERTARIANISM 80–81 (1991); POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 1 
(Ron Christenson ed., 1991); STONE, supra note 47, at 205. 
53 CLEMENS P. WORK, DARKEST BEFORE DAWN: SEDITION AND FREE SPEECH IN THE AMERICAN 
WEST 250 (2005); Exult as Bolshevikis, FORT WAYNE NEWS & SENTINEL (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Oct. 25, 
1918, at 8.   
54 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 618–19. 
55 Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
56 Id. at 629–30.  Not only were the prison sentences of the group of pamphleteers 
incommensurable to their calls for a labor strike, but the police beat the defendants.  ALAN M. 
DERSHOWITZ, AMERICA ON TRIAL: INSIDE THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT TRANSFORMED OUR NATION 
230 (2004). 
57 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Amendment, for instance, protects parody58 and pornography,59 even 
though neither mode of expression necessarily weighs the validity of ideas.  
A further weakness with Holmes’s “market place of ideas” test is its 
disregard for how wealth disparities differentiate persons’ abilities to have 
their message heard.  Sometimes having more resources can make it easier 
to convince audiences of the validity of false ideas because the source of 
the correct ones lacks the means to air them on prominent outlets, like 
television and radio.  Well-funded, but wrong-headed, organizations 
exploiting media contacts are sometimes more likely to influence 
audiences than paupers with sound theories but inadequate access to the 
airwaves or broadband.60 
The Holmes decisions provide university administrators with guidance 
for preventing dangerous speech.  By themselves, however, they leave the 
impression that only the most immediately threatening expressions can be 
excluded from the marketplace of ideas.  To the contrary, the Supreme 
Court has on numerous occasions recognized that speech is not an absolute 
right.61  A variety of restrictions on speech, such as copyright statutes62 and 
                                                                                                                          
58 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, Inc., 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects parody that “could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts 
about the public figure involved”). 
59 Supreme Court jurisprudence distinguishes “pornography” and “obscenity.”  Unlike 
pornography, at least in certain forms, obscenity is an unprotected form of communication.  See 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239–41, 258 (2002) (finding that “virtual child 
pornography” using computer graphics is a protected form of communication); Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, 31–32 (1973) (defining obscenity within the context of “‘contemporary community 
standards’” (quoting Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966))); Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“[O]bscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or 
press.”).  But see Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108, 111 (1990) (holding that a state may 
constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (upholding a state statute prohibiting persons from knowingly promoting 
depictions of sexual performances involving children). 
60 See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2376–
77 n.105 (2007) (expressing the concern that “monetary power” not impede deliberation and political 
participation in a representative democracy); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright 
in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1886 (2000) (“[I]n an unregulated market, 
wealth disparity skews public discourse in favor of speakers with the financial wherewithal to own a 
mass media outlet and consumers likely to buy speech and the products that advertisers want to sell.”); 
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying 
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 589 (2004) (stating that free speech is a means to preserve social and 
political equality against wealth disparities, but that because profitability drives media licensing fees, it 
functionally limits accessibility to media outlets). 
61 In Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, the majority explicitly stated that the “Court has frequently 
denied that First Amendment rights are absolute.”  427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976); see also Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[A]lthough the rights of free speech 
and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute.”), overruled by Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
62 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (identifying a “‘definitional balance between the 
First Amendment and the Copyright Act’” that permits the freedom to communicate facts while 
continuing to protect authors’ original expressions (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985))). 
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zoning ordinances,63 indicate that not all manner of expressions are 
covered by the First Amendment. 
The function of speech in a democracy helps to reconcile the 
seemingly absolute language of the First Amendment64 with legitimate 
restraints on self-assertion.  Justice Louis Brandeis’s seminal concurrence 
to Whitney v. California outlined the function of the constitutional 
protections of free expression to include the ability to think and speak 
freely in order to discover and disseminate political truths.65  Speech is not, 
however, only instrumental.  It is also “an end in itself” that is essential for 
human beings to achieve their individual sense of purpose.66  The First 
Amendment is not only a protection of the polity but of the human drive to 
demonstrate a sense of self-identity and to preserve individual dignity.67  
Free discussion, Brandeis believed, facilitates social stability by allowing 
persons to publically vent volatile disagreements rather than allowing them 
to fester into unresolved hatreds.68  The sentiments Brandeis expressed in 
his concurrence have become the accepted values of protecting free 
speech.69  True threats fall outside these accepted bounds of self-assertion 
because they are meant to menace someone with physical harm.70  To 
                                                                                                                          
63 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–48, 54–55 (1986) (holding that 
an adult theater zoning ordinance was content-neutral and only subject to intermediate scrutiny because 
the law targeted the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments).  Justice Brennan and 
Justice Kennedy criticized Renton’s “content-neutral” characterization in two separate concurrences.  
City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part). 
64 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of  
speech . . . .”). 
65 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
66 Brandeis explained that: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to 
make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative 
forces should prevail over the arbitrary.  They valued liberty both as an end and as a 
means.  They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the 
secret of liberty.   
Id.  
67 In the words of Justice Marshall: 
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the 
human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression.  Such expression is an integral 
part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity.  To suppress expression is 
to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront the individual’s worth 
and dignity.  
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring), overruled by Thornburgh v. 
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
68 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
69 See Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 
606 (1996) (“At least since the famed concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 
it has been well accepted that the answer to supposedly harmful speech is not governmental 
suppression, but rather more speech.” (footnote omitted)); Philippa Strum, Brandeis: The Public 
Activist and Freedom of Speech, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 659, 706 (2007) (“Brandeis’s Whitney opinion and 
the doctrine embedded in it eventually became the cornerstone of American speech jurisprudence.”). 
70 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (suggesting that willfully threatening 
the President may amount to unprotected expression); In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 647 (Cal. 
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survive constitutional scrutiny, the regulation of cross burning, swastika 
displays, or other intimidating images in a university must be mindful of 
First Amendment values while also preserving individuals’ right to live 
undisturbed from the threat of immediate or future harm. 
B.  The Expression of Hate 
The democratic purpose of First Amendment protection, which allows 
for the expression of ideas to enrich dialogue, raises a challenge to the 
formulation of university hate speech regulations.  Existing jurisprudence, 
nevertheless, indicates that intimidating threats do not fall under the core 
speech protected by the Constitution. 
Several mid-twentieth century cases identified some of the harmful 
expressions that are unprotected by the First Amendment.  In a case 
decided during World War II, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,71 the Court 
found that a Jehovah’s Witness who verbally attacked a police marshal 
could be prosecuted pursuant to an ordinance prohibiting public 
incitement.72  The Court has long contrasted constitutional expression and 
violent bombast because “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly 
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have 
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”73  The social 
interest in “order and morality” outweighs any cathartic benefit a speaker 
may derive.74  Just as fighting words are unprotected by the First 
Amendment because they are unconnected to traditional speech values, 
neither should hate speech receive First Amendment protection when it 
aims to incite people to commit harmful acts against identifiable groups.75  
Not all hate speech seeks to incite others to act; sometimes it is simply a 
true threat that might constitute an assault.76  But where hate speech 
threatens a protected group and seeks to incite others to act against an 
identifiable target, a university speech code can punish it.  The free 
exchange of ideas is not furthered through exhortations to attack, harm, or 
                                                                                                                          
Ct. App. 1994) (finding that “malicious” cross burning on another person’s property constitutes a form 
of “true threat”). 
71 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
72 Id. at 569, 573–74. 
73 Id. at 571–72.  Recent cases have confirmed the continued vitality of the “fighting words” 
doctrine.  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–59 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
382–83 (1992). 
74 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (concluding that the social interest in “order and morality” 
outweighs the social benefits that “‘fighting’ words” may offer). 
75 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 401 (White, J., concurring) (“[A] ban on all fighting words or on a 
subset of the fighting words category would restrict only the social evil of hate speech, without creating 
the danger of driving viewpoints from the marketplace.”). 
76 See Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of 
Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1378 (1998) (finding that the burning of a cross “in 
front of the home of an African-American family” is sufficient to constitute an assault “if family 
members observe it and suffer imminent fear for their safety”). 
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discriminate against others.77  A judge determining whether a verbal attack 
is dangerous enough to constitute an offense must consider the context in 
which it was uttered.  Even the content-based regulation of speech that is 
drafted with enough generality not to discriminate against particular 
viewpoints can be a permissible use of government power when “the evil 
to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests.”78 
Fighting words are analogous to hate speech insofar as both are meant 
to provoke violent reaction rather than to elicit discussion.  In 
circumstances where fighting words are meant to intimidate others by 
reference to historically intimidating symbols, like swastikas or burning 
crosses, they enter the realm of hate speech.  Neither form of expression 
seeks to promote debate.  Rather than being discursive, hate messages are 
meant to be threatening or damaging to targeted individuals.79 
The enormous import of free speech renders it imperative to take 
utmost care to prevent any regulation of hate speech to become an excuse 
for the repression of heterodox ideas.80  Unconstitutional infringements 
                                                                                                                          
77 See id. at 1318, 1378–79 (suggesting that hate speech, when directed against particular persons, 
lacks sufficient value to justify the injuries and rights violations it causes, and therefore does not merit 
First Amendment protection).  But see John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision 
of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 90 & n.167 (1996) (arguing that, under a property-
based theory of the First Amendment, many difficulties would arise in attempting to regulate hate 
speech). 
78 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (asserting that “it is not rare that a 
content-based classification of speech has been accepted [as constitutional] because it may be 
appropriately generalized that within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so 
overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests”).  Some opponents of hate speech codes claim that 
the Supreme Court has “largely abandoned” the fighting words doctrine.  ALAN CHARLES KORS & 
HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THE SHADOW UNIVERSITY: THE BETRAYAL OF LIBERTY ON AMERICA’S 
CAMPUSES 86 (1998).  That claim, however, does not hold up against the fact that Supreme Court 
Justices have regularly relied on Chaplinsky.  See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410–11 
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that, originally, the First Amendment did not protect student 
speech in public schools); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740 
(1996) (citing Chaplinsky for the proposition that Congress and states can “address the most serious 
problems” through legislation); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (using Chaplinsky for 
precedential value, but distinguishing it from the case at bar).  For Courts of Appeals citations to 
Chaplinsky, see, for example, IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 2864 (2009); DeJohn v. Temple University, 537 F.3d 301, 320 (3d Cir. 2008); United States 
v. Judd, 315 F. App’x 35, 40 (10th Cir. 2008). 
79 See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (stating that “above all else, the 
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content”). 
80 By “heterodox” opinions, I mean those that are outside the mainstream and unpopular.  District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (stating that the First Amendment protects “the 
expression of extremely unpopular and wrong-headed views”); Communist Party v. Subversive 
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe that it can be 
too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First 
Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we 
cherish.”).  First Amendment jurisprudence has developed to prevent the abuse of neutral-sounding 
statutes to repress public debate.  See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of 
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 442 (1996) (“[T]he First 
Amendment bans restrictions on speech arising from hostility, sympathy, or self-interest.  The fact is 
that courts cannot enforce this ban directly.”). 
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against unpopular views were common during and after the First World 
War and throughout the Red Scare in the mid-1950s, when political 
suppression of Communist or anarchist statements stifled public debate.81 
Hate speakers do not merely add an unpopular perspective into the 
marketplace of ideas; if they did no more than that their views would be 
protected.  Their aim is to incite illegal conduct, to intimidate, or to harm 
the reputation of a select group of the public.82  Justice Byron R. White’s 
concurrence in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul dismissed the notion that hate 
speech is a legitimate form of political discourse: “Instead, it permits, 
indeed invites, the continuation of expressive conduct that . . . is evil and 
worthless in First Amendment terms . . . .  [C]haracterizing fighting words 
as a form of ‘debate[]’ . . . legitimates hate speech as a form of public 
discussion.”83 
Not all expressions of hatred and intolerance are advocacy; therefore, 
some expressions of apathy, disdain, or outright malevolence do not fit the 
paradigm of administratively punishable hate speech.  Where only the 
private expression of racism is involved without any provable intent to 
harm, it is beyond the purview of government regulation.  Under these 
circumstances, even the depiction of symbols associated with violence 
cannot be prosecuted where they are displayed in some private location, 
like a home, or even at a private hate rally.  Brandenburg v. Ohio84 
indicates that the First Amendment protects the liberty right of students 
who unobtrusively display racially or ethnically hateful emblems or 
insignia.  That case involved the criminal conviction of a man under the 
Ohio Criminal Syndicalism law for leading a Ku Klux Klan rally.85  The 
Klansmen and an invited journalist attended the meeting at which a cross 
was burned.  Because the journalist was invited, he never sensed any threat 
                                                                                                                          
81 For a discussion of the regulation of expressive activities during this time period, see Dale 
Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1520–25 (2001). 
82 See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 402 (2008) (distinguishing “Western” regulations on incitement hate speech 
from U.S. laws); John C. Knechtle, Holocaust Denial and the Concept of Dignity in the European 
Union, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 41, 46 (2008) (noting that “fighting words” and “true threats,” among 
other forms of speech, do not receive First Amendment protection); Alexander Tsesis, The Boundaries 
of Free Speech, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 141, 159–60 (2005) [hereinafter Tsesis, Boundaries] 
(alteration in original) (explaining that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires 
signatory states to prevent “‘[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’”). 
83 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 402 (1992) (White, J., concurring). 
84 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
85 See id. at 444–45 (alterations in original) (prohibiting “‘advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or 
propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing 
industrial or political reform’ and for ‘voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage 
of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism’”  (quoting OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (1964))).  At its core, the law prohibited the use of political advocacy to instigate 
criminal conduct.  Id.  at 448–49. 
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from the burning cross.  At the event, armed persons made derogatory 
statements about blacks and Jews.86  The only statement entered into the 
record that could have been interpreted as incitement was couched in 
qualifications that would have made it virtually impossible to prove 
criminal intent: “The Klan has more members in the State of Ohio than 
does any other organization.  We’re not a revengent organization, but if our 
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the 
white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some 
revengeance taken.”87  The Court held that under the circumstances, given 
that the recorded speeches were abstract assertions rather than advocacy to 
commit imminent violence, application of the Ohio statute would intrude 
on First and Fourteenth Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly.88  
The statute was also unconstitutional on its face since it punished mere 
advocacy.89 
The case remains relevant even though more recent jurisprudence has 
qualified its central holding.90  In Brandenburg, the Court indicated that 
only under imminently dangerous circumstances does advocacy warrant 
regulation to prevent speakers from inciting others to commit lawless 
actions.91  In examining the constitutionality of restrictions, the Court 
determined that trial courts must review the context in which a statement 
was made to determine whether it is likely to instigate socially or 
individually harmful consequences.92  In criminal trials, the prosecution 
must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the speaker actually 
intended to achieve the advocated criminal act.93 
The Brandenburg standard prevents the punishment of empty or even 
                                                                                                                          
86 Id. at 445–46.  On the film, Brandenburg appeared in Klan regalia speaking of vengeance and 
advocating sending blacks to Africa and Jews to Israel.  WAYNE OVERBECK, MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF 
MEDIA LAW 56 (2007). 
87 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446. 
88 Id. at 448–49. 
89 Id. at 449. 
90 See infra text accompanying notes 98 and 130. 
91 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (espousing the principle that “the constitutional guarantees 
of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or 
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and is likely to incite or produce such action”). 
92 See Frederick Schauer, Is It Better To Be Safe than Sorry?: Free Speech and the Precautionary 
Principle, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 301, 307 (2009) (“[A]s new events cause us to revise our previous 
estimates, it should come as little surprise that these new events should cause us to re-examine . . . the 
doctrines that have emanated out of earlier and possibly outdated empirical estimates.”).  In a recent 
dissent, Justice Breyer recognized the relevance of contextualized analysis of speech in cases involving 
public safety.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2851–52 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
93 The plurality in Virginia v. Black set out the parameters of a “true threats” statute that prohibits 
intentional intimidation: “‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular 
individual or group of individuals.”  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).  In a related subject 
on hate speech, Jeannine Bell has provided a discussion of state statutes prohibiting the intimidating 
display of nooses.  Jeannine Bell, The Hangman’s Noose and the Lynch Mob: Hate Speech and the 
Jena Six, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 351–52 (2009). 
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emotionally charged threats.  It aims to prevent the government from 
persecuting anyone who jokingly, in the heat of the moment, or out of 
simmering anger, urges unlawful conduct.  Professor Thomas Healy’s 
recent claim that criminal advocacy is part of the search for truth, self-
government, or self-fulfillment94 does not get at the core of the decision’s 
holding.  In fact, criminal advocacy coupled with intent to bring about the 
crime is unlike the Ku Klux Klan scenario of Brandenburg.95  The Klan 
gathering was at a private location with only one person, the invited 
journalist, not a participant of the rally.  Unlike Frohwerk, Debs, and 
Schenck, the inflammatory language in Brandenburg was not directed to a 
public audience.  As I will explain below, the Court has found that 
expression of hate only becomes criminal when it is advocacy calculated to 
achieve criminal conduct.  
General racist statements at public university campuses are probably 
protected forms of expression, but when a person stands up in a classroom 
or in the college commons area and advocates the commission of specific 
criminal conduct, his statements are no longer immune from campus 
regulation and criminal prosecution.96  No educational purpose is served by 
criminal incitement on campus that incorporates symbols historically 
linked to violence, such as swastikas and burning crosses.97 
As comprehensive as the Brandenburg imminence standard sounds, 
there are circumstances where the state can prohibit hate speech that is 
neither imminently harmful nor instigative.  Most important, in 
Beauharnais v. Illinois,98 the Court determined that states and cities may 
prohibit group defamation, even when it does not pose an imminent threat 
of harm.99  Several scholars and judges have wrongly claimed that group 
defamation is no longer constitutional after New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan100 and R.A.V.,101 but their arguments are not only conjectural but 
                                                                                                                          
94 Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 683–89 
(2009). 
95 See Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1309 (2007) (stating 
that “like Brandenburg, Schenck demanded that courts scrutinize only the likelihood that speech would 
trigger some harm or danger, not the enormity or significance of the threat”). 
96 Recent circuit court decisions indicate that common areas at universities are designated public 
fora.  E.g., Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 978–80 (8th Cir. 2006); ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 
444 (4th Cir. 2005). 
97 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (“[W]here state-operated educational institutions 
are involved, this Court has long recognized ‘the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools.’” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 
(1969))). 
98 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
99 See id. at 266 (“Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected 
speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase 
‘clear and present danger.’”). 
100 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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dismissive of recent Supreme Court cases that make clear that Beauharnais 
remains valid precedent. 
In Beauharnais, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a group libel 
statute that rendered it actionable to “portray[] depravity, criminality . . . or 
lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed, or religion” 
and to expose those citizens to “contempt, derision, or obloquy.”102  The 
majority found that, given Illinois’s history of racial friction, its legislature 
could enact legislation to punish the dissemination of demeaning messages, 
such as those opposed to neighborhood integration, because those 
messages threatened “the peace and well-being of the State.”103  The 
opinion conceived of government playing a role in establishing a standard 
of decency designed to prevent intergroup friction. 
Of the four justices who dissented in Beauharnais, only one, Justice 
Hugo Black, espoused an absolutist view of the First Amendment.104  
While the other three dissenters agreed that the conviction should be 
overturned, they nonetheless agreed with the majority that, under some 
circumstances, group defamation could be an actionable offense.105  Justice 
Stanley Reed claimed that group defamation statutes could only be 
constitutional if they required proof of criminal incitements.106  Justice 
William O. Douglas’s dissent found the statute to be vague but recognized 
the potential dangers of hate speech: 
Hitler and his Nazis showed how evil a conspiracy could 
be which was aimed at destroying a race by exposing it to 
                                                                                                                          
101 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 978 (2d 
ed. 2002) (concluding that the statute in Beauharnais “almost certainly would be declared 
unconstitutional today based on vagueness and overbreadth grounds”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 185–86 (1995) (stating that commentators believe 
that broadly-defined bans on hate speech are no longer valid); Cedric Merlin Powell, The Mythological 
Marketplace of Ideas: R.A.V., Mitchell, and Beyond, 12 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 34 (1995) 
(arguing that, after Sullivan, Beauharnais “is no longer persuasive authority”); Nadine Strossen, 
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 517–18 (noting that 
“[t]he group defamation concept . . . has been thoroughly discredited by others”); Jonathan D. Varat, 
Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1116–17 n.29 (2006) (observing that numerous lower courts and commentators 
have concluded that Beauharnais is no longer good law).  Sunstein argues that the First Amendment 
protects speech because it is vital to self-governance in a “deliberative democracy,” in which “new 
information and perspectives influence social judgments about possible courses of action,” and believes 
some forms of hate speech do not contribute to “social deliberation.”  SUNSTEIN, supra, at 18–19, 198. 
102 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251, 266–67 (quoting 38 ILL. REV. STAT. § 471 (1949)). 
103 Id. at 252, 258–59.  This law against the dissemination of class and group prejudices had a 
long history before the Court’s Beauharnais opinion, appearing as early as 1919 in a collection of 
Illinois statutes.  2 ANNOTATED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 1497 (Oliver A. Harker ed., 
1919). 
104 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 274–75 (Black, J., dissenting). 
105 Id. at 283–84 (Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 284–85, 287 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 299–302 
(Jackson, J., dissenting).  
106 See id. at 279, 283 (Reed, J., dissenting) (arguing that free speech rights may be abridged 
“when speech becomes an incitement to crime,” but that words giving rise to speech limitations “[need 
to] be reasonably well defined”). 
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contempt, derision, and obloquy.  I would be willing to 
concede that such conduct directed at a race or group in this 
country could be made an indictable offense.107   
Finally, Justice Robert Jackson agreed that the state could pass group 
libel laws, but dissented because the trial judge did not give Defendant 
Beauharnais, the president of a racist Chicago organization, an adequate 
opportunity to proffer his defense.108 
Beauharnais might offer a model for formulating one type of campus 
hate speech code,109 but several authors challenge its precedential value.  
Dean Rodney Smolla, for instance, states that “Beauharnais is flatly 
inconsistent with modern First Amendment doctrines restraining content-
based and view-point based discrimination.”110  Smolla explains this view 
by analogy to other free speech jurisprudence.  In this, he provides 
reasoning that similarly minded authors do not.  For instance, Professor 
Eugene Volokh is content to claim that “Beauharnais is now widely 
regarded as no longer being good law,”111 but he does not provide any 
argument for his opinion.  Volokh further claims that any university group 
libel prohibition would be unconstitutional.112  Smolla, on the other hand, 
expostulates on the doctrine from other areas of free speech 
jurisprudence.113  He claims that just as the Court does not countenance 
restrictions on lewd or profane speech, neither does it approve of criminal 
group libel statutes.114  This analogy is incongruous because lewd and 
                                                                                                                          
107 Id. at 284 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
108 Id. at 299–301 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
109 See, e.g., Rhonda G. Hartman, Revitalizing Group Defamation as a Remedy for Hate Speech 
on Campus, 71 OR. L. REV. 855, 884–85 (1992) (“Beauharnais underscores the importance that the 
First Amendment value accorded defamation by the Court has to the success of university proscription 
of group defamatory hate speech.  Because group defamation is not fully protected speech, a court 
would probably find a reasonable university determination of harm sufficient to justify even an 
absolute prohibition of hateful, vilifying expression.”); Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free 
Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11, 35 (1985) (“Beauharnais . . . 
strengthens the argument that the Court would approve a properly drawn and construed statute or 
judicial ruling proscribing racial defamation of a group.”); James R. Bussian, Comment, Anatomy of 
the Campus Speech Code: An Examination of Prevailing Regulations, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 153, 179 
(1995) (“If a university wants to convey its commitment to having an environment free of 
discrimination to its students, a speech code formulated after the language in the group defamation 
statute in Beauharnais is one possible solution whose utility has yet to be realized.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
110 Rodney A. Smolla, Words “Which by Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury”: The Evolving 
Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317, 
351–52 (2009). 
111 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 223, 238 n.87 (1996).  Volokh is similarly dismissive of the case in an earlier work.  See 
Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 
1819–20 n.127 (1992). 
112 Volokh, supra note 111, at 420. 
113 Rodney A. Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a University, 53 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 215–16 (1990). 
114 Id. at 208. 
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profane language is neither related to the incitement of violence nor to 
group libel.  Smolla also asserts that “Beauharnais cannot survive side by 
side with cases such as Brandenburg.”115  This latter statement overlooks 
post-Brandenburg jurisprudence. 
A weakness in this line of counter-arguments is that while proclaiming 
allegiance to Supreme Court jurisprudence, Smolla and Volokh avoid key 
cases that challenge their perspective.  Particularly glaring is the reliance 
on a circuit court case, Collin v. Smith,116 in an effort to demonstrate that 
“subsequent developments in libel and political speech jurisprudence have 
implicitly overruled Beauharnais.”117  Relying on an appellate court case 
in order to demonstrate the invalidity of Beauharnais is analytically 
unsound.  In Collin, the Seventh Circuit stated that cases like Brandenburg 
“implicitly” raised a question as to whether “Beauharnais would pass 
constitutional muster today.”118  But the court of appeals never assumed 
away the binding precedent; instead, it found that the law in question did 
not survive the Beauharnais analysis.119  The Collin court’s rhetorical 
statement used implicit logic, but its explicit statements about Supreme 
Court precedent lead to the opposite conclusion.  After the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in Collin, Justice Blackmun took the unusual step of 
publishing a statement on behalf of himself and Justice White.  Blackmun 
did so to indicate his sense that “the Seventh Circuit’s decision is in some 
tension with Beauharnais.  That case has not been overruled or formally 
limited in any way.”120  While this assertion is not part of a binding 
opinion, it has been borne out by subsequent majority opinions, the most 
recent one issued in 2010, demonstrating that the holding in Beauharnais 
has neither been overturned nor even questioned.121 
                                                                                                                          
115 Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. 
Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 444 (1988). 
116 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
117 Steven G. Gey, What If Wisconsin v. Mitchell Had Involved Martin Luther King, Jr.? The 
Constitutional Flaws of Hate Crime Enhancement Statutes, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1014, 1055 (1997); 
see also Lili Levi, Reporting the Official Truth: The Revival of the FCC’s News Distortion Policy, 78 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1084 & n.286 (2000) (referring to Collin as an example of the court declining to 
apply Beauharnais to a Nazi march in Skokie, Illinois); Jendi B. Reiter, Redskins and Scarlet Letters: 
Why “Immoral” and “Scandalous” Trademarks Should Be Federally Registrable, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 191, 
202–03 (1996) (describing Collin which “considered Beauharnais to be invalid, or at the least limited 
to situations where a breach of the peace is imminent”).  Justice Richard Posner recently reaffirmed a 
commitment to his own vision of group defamation, ignoring the body of Supreme Court precedents 
that reaffirm its constitutionality.  Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 
668, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]hough Beauharnais v. Illinois has never been overruled, no one thinks the 
First Amendment would today be interpreted to allow group defamation to be prohibited.” (citation 
omitted)). 
118 Collin, 578 F.2d at 1204. 
119 Id. at 1204–05. 
120 Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
121 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (“‘From 1791 to the  
present’ . . . the First Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions upon the content of the speech in a few 
limited areas,’ and has never ‘include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.’  These 
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Another common error in the academic literature is to rely on a second 
Seventh Circuit case, American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut,122 to claim, in 
the sternly dramatic words of one author, that “[t]he doctrinal tides that 
have swept libel in general into the First Amendment ocean have left 
Beauharnais . . . high and dry.”123  In Hudnut, the appellate court in fact 
believed it was following precedent, claiming “that cases such as New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan [have] so washed away the foundations of 
Beauharnais that it [can no longer] be considered authoritative.”124  The 
circuit court admitted that its presumption might be incorrect, but found 
that the case did not support the challenged ordinance irrespective of 
Beauharnais’s status.125 
The Seventh Circuit was mistaken in its understanding of the judicial 
trend.  Sullivan established the requirement that any public figure suing in 
defamation prove that the offensive false statement was uttered with actual 
malice.126  Consequently, its effect on Beauharnais extends only to cases 
where group libels are directed against public personalities, in which case 
the actual malice standard applies.  But Sullivan had no effect on private 
group defamation cases.  The Supreme Court made this point in a 1982 
case, New York v. Ferber, stating that, except in special cases related to 
public officials, Beauharnais continues to be the controlling precedent on 
the publication of group libels.127  Consequently, misethnic group 
defamation that is directed against public officials can be prohibited when 
stated maliciously, despite the actual knowledge of the statement’s 
falsehood and with the reckless disregard for its truth value.128  Yet, staying 
true to Sullivan’s restraints, it is still constitutional for the state to place 
                                                                                                                          
‘historic and traditional categories’ . . . includ[e] obscenity [and] defamation . . . .”); R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (“We have recognized that ‘the freedom of speech’ referred to by 
the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.”); Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984) (“[T]here are categories of 
communication and certain special utterances to which the majestic protection of the First Amendment 
does not extend . . . .  Libelous speech has been held to constitute one such category.”). 
122 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, Hudnut v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
123 Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes into Focus When You Remove the Lens Cap: Why 
Proliferating New Communications Technologies Make It Particularly Urgent for the Supreme Court 
to Abandon Its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom of Speech and Bring Obscenity, Fighting Words, and 
Group Libel Within the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 883, 950 (1996).  
124 Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 331–32 n.3. 
125 Id.  
126 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (“The constitutional guarantees 
require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory 
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual 
malice’ . . . .”). 
127 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (citing Sullivan and Beauharnais for the 
proposition that, “[l]eaving aside the special considerations when public officials are the target, a 
libelous publication is not protected by the Constitution”).   
128 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (concluding that a prohibition on the ability of a public 
official to recover damages for defamation does not include instances where a speaker makes a 
defamatory statement falsely or “with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”); see also 
TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 26, at 2 (defining “misethnicity”). 
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prohibitions on expressions which “portray[] ‘depravity, criminality . . . or 
lack of virtue’ of ‘a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed, or religion’” 
and make that group subject to “‘contempt, derision, or obloquy.’”129  
Group defamation made against persons who are not public officials would 
fall under the standard set forth in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,130 requiring 
only proof of the defamer’s negligence to prevail.131  
Counter-intuitively, the most convincing indication of Beauharnais’s 
vitality comes from the very Supreme Court decision that for years had 
been the mainstay of opponents to university hate speech codes, R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul.132  The case explicitly enumerated several types of 
expressions, including group defamation, that are unprotected by the First 
Amendment.133 
For a decade, R.A.V. hindered universities determined to punish the 
expression of hatred against racial, religious, ethnic, gender, national, or 
sexual orientation groups.  The  R.A.V. case arose when some juveniles set 
fire to a cross on a black family’s lawn.134  The youths were charged under 
a St. Paul ordinance which made it a misdemeanor to display, in public or 
private places, symbols—like Nazi swastikas and burning crosses—which 
are known to “‘arouse anger, alarm or resentment . . . on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion or gender.’”135  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Scalia held that the ordinance resulted in unconstitutional “content 
discrimination.”136  The statute was flawed, he explained, because rather 
than punishing the use of all fighting words the law singled out hate 
speech.137  Scalia acknowledged that St. Paul had a compelling interest in 
protecting the human rights of the “members of groups that have 
historically been subjected to discrimination.”138  To accomplish that end, 
however, the city could enact a blanket prohibition on hostile 
expressions.139 
Justice White sharply disagreed with the majority, arguing that it 
deviated from precedents that had long allowed for content-based 
                                                                                                                          
129 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 270–71 (1952) (quoting 38 ILL. REV. STAT. § 471 
(1949)). 
130 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
131 Id. at 350. 
132 505 U.S. 377, 402 (1992). 
133 Id. at 383 (mentioning defamation as an area in which First Amendment safeguards are at a 
minimum).  The Court explicitly stated that “[e]ven the prohibition against content discrimination . . . is 
not absolute.”  Id. at 387. 
134 Id. at 379. 
135 Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)). 
136 Id. at 387 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
137 See id. at 391 (concluding that the ordinance applied only to “‘fighting words’ that insult, or 
provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender’”). 
138 Id. at 395. 
139 See id. at 395–96 (“The dispositive question . . . is whether content discrimination is 
reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul’s compelling interests; it plainly is not.  An ordinance not 
limited to the favored topics, for example, would have precisely the same beneficial effect.”). 
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regulation of low-level speech.140  Using language reminiscent of the 
rationale behind the fighting words doctrine in Chaplinsky, White pointed 
out that nothing is wrong with prohibiting the use of a subset of speech that 
is “by definition worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection.”141  
In his estimation, the majority illegitimately substituted its judgment for 
the city’s conclusion that disparagements “based on race, color, creed, 
religion, [and] gender” pose “more pressing public concerns than the 
harms caused by other fighting words.”142  In his most poignant comments, 
White blamed the majority for elevating worthless fighting words to the 
level of “debate.”143 
White’s concurrence, therefore, recognized the constitutionality of hate 
speech regulations, but he joined the court’s judgment because the specific 
ordinance in the case covered protected forms of speech.144  St. Paul had 
sought to prevent the use of insults to cause offense or resentment.145  In a 
separate concurrence, Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice White that the 
scope of the statute was overbroad.146  He further believed there to be “no 
First Amendment values that are compromised by a law that prohibits 
hoodlums from driving minorities out of their homes by burning crosses on 
their lawns.”147 
In a third concurrence, Justice Stevens poked holes in the majority’s 
reasoning.  He pointed to several constitutional limits on utterances.  For 
example, “a city can prohibit political advertisements in its buses while 
allowing other advertisements.”148  Like White and Blackmun, he found 
the majority’s assertion that all content-based regulations are 
unconstitutional to be disingenuous and precedentially unsound.149  Just as 
the state can differentiate between various forms of commercial speech, so 
too can it choose to prohibit some but not all types of fighting words.150  In 
formulating legislative policy, lawmakers can evaluate the potential social 
harms that are likely to result from varying forms of fighting words.151 
Any hope that R.A.V. was an absolute ban against any regulation of 
                                                                                                                          
140 Id. at 401 (White, J., concurring). 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 407. 
143 Id. at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
144 Id. at 411, 413. 
145 Id. at 414. 
146 Id. at 416 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
149 Id. at 419. 
150 See id. at 434 (“[E]ven if the St. Paul ordinance did regulate fighting words based on its 
subject matter, such a regulation would . . . be constitutional. . . .  [S]ubject-matter-based regulations on 
commercial speech are widespread and largely unproblematic.”). 
151 See Shannon Gilreath, “Tell Your Faggot Friend He Owes Me $500 for My Broken Hand”: 
Thoughts on a Substantive Equality Theory of Free Speech, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 557, 574 (2009) 
(discussing the importance of the First Amendment theory of assessing the social context of speech to 
determine when words become dehumanizing, degrading, and subjugating actions). 
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hate speech was short-lived.152  While it has not been overtly overruled, its 
impact has been ameliorated.  Black is the most recent Supreme Court case 
to shed light on the allowable elements of college hate speech codes.  The 
case arose from the prosecution of individuals for cross burning153 pursuant 
to a more narrowly drafted statute than the one struck down in R.A.V.  
Virginia’s law made it  
unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of 
intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause 
to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or 
other public place.  Any person who shall violate any 
provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.   
Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie 
evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of 
persons.154 
A majority of justices agreed that the state did not violate the First 
Amendment by punishing intentionally intimidating displays of burning 
crosses.155  Mimicking the language in Chaplinsky, the Court found that 
such conduct was of “‘such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.’”156  The statute did not run afoul of the 
prohibition against content discrimination because it prohibited all manner 
of cross burning, irrespective of whether it sought to intimidate others on 
the basis of their race, religion, or other characteristics.157  The Court 
explained that Virginia could selectively punish cross burnings, even 
though it did not criminalize all other forms of virulent intimidation, “in 
light of cross burning’s long and pernicious history as a signal of 
impending violence.”158 
An important distinction between the St. Paul ordinance and the 
Virginia statute was that the latter prohibited the entire category of 
threatening cross burnings, not just those that expressed hatred toward a 
particular group.  The city ordinance struck down by the R.A.V. Court, on 
the other hand, only prohibited cross burnings meant to “arouse[] anger, 
                                                                                                                          
152 For a discussion on R.A.V.’s nearly absolutist perspective on speech, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, 
Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575, 602 
(2005); Edward J. Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in America, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
953, 973 (2004); Friedrich Kübler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech?: Transnational Aspects of a 
Conflict of Human Rights, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 335, 363–64 (1998); Hon. John Paul Stevens, The 
Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1310 (1993).   
153 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 348 (2003). 
154 Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996)). 
155 Id. at 347. 
156 Id. at 358–59 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992)). 
157 Id. at 362–63. 
158 Id. at 363. 
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alarm or resentment in others . . . on the basis of race, color, creed, religion 
or gender.”159  A narrow reading of Black would require campus hate 
speech codes to be as open-ended as the Virginia statue.  A broader reading 
of Black, however, is that the underlying problem of the Minnesota 
ordinance was that it prohibited words that merely aroused an emotive 
response rather than intimidated persons.  The broader reading would 
indicate that a university could pass a speech code punishing cross 
burnings that intimidate others because of their racial-, social-, gender-, 
political-, or sexual orientation-group statuses.  The Black decision is 
unclear about whether both types of regulations, or only the open-ended 
one, would pass constitutional muster. 
What is clear is that only intentionally symbolic intimidation may be 
regulated, but the Court in Black did not agree on whether the fact-finder 
can infer the scienter element or if the prosecutor must prove it—only a 
plurality of the Court found the statute’s prima facie evidence presumption 
to be unconstitutional.160  The group of four justices who comprised the 
plurality argued that without requiring prosecutors to prove a defendant’s 
state of mind, juries would lack context to determine “whether a particular 
cross burning is intended to intimidate.”161 
Several states currently have cross burning and harassment laws.162  
                                                                                                                          
159 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
160 See Black, 538 U.S. at 368 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I write 
separately . . . to explain why I believe there is no justification for the plurality’s apparent decision to 
invalidate [the prima facie evidence] provision on its face.”). 
161 Id. at 367 (plurality opinion).  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Stevens, and 
Breyer made up the plurality, holding that the prima facie element of the Virginia statute was 
unconstitutional.  Id.  Justice Scalia, who had joined those four in other parts of the opinion, argued that 
the prima facie presumption was a legitimate rebuttable presumption.  Id. at 368–69 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Thomas joined Scalia on this point.  But Thomas also 
wrote a separate dissent, arguing that cross burning was by definition a violent form of intimidation.  
See id. at 388–89 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that “whatever expressive value cross burning has, 
the legislature simply wrote it out by banning only intimidating conduct undertaken by a particular 
means” and that “the association between acts of intimidating cross burning and violence is well 
documented in recent American history”).  Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment in part and joined 
by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, never reached the prima facie issue, writing instead against the 
constitutionality of the entire statute: “In my view, severance of the prima facie evidence provision now 
could not eliminate the unconstitutionality of the whole statute at the time of the respondents’ conduct.”  
Id. at 387 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
162 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1707 (2010) (prohibiting cross burning); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 18-7902(b) (2004) (making the “placing of any word or symbol commonly associated with 
racial, religious or ethnic terrorism on the property of another person [unlawful] without his or her 
permission”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.6 (West 2010) (specifying the elements of cross 
burning); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.095 (West 2010) (defining the crime of cross burning); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 45-5-221 (2009) (establishing the crime of “malicious intimidation or harassment” relating to 
civil or human rights); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19B-2 (2006) (defining one type of hate crime as 
defacement by burning crosses and “the placing of any word or symbol commonly associated with 
racial, religious, or ethnic terrorism on the property of another person without that person’s 
permission”); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9A.36.080(2) (West 2009) (prohibiting acts like burning 
crosses and defacing property with a swastika), amended on other grounds, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 
961–62. 
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The new doctrine on hate speech provides state universities clear 
parameters for developing hate speech policies that punish the depiction of 
hateful symbolic speech with a culpable frame of mind.  International 
protocols on racist and xenophobic speech provide further reason to 
believe that university hate speech codes do not violate the underlying 
principles of democratic free speech. 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL POLICY 
University administrators wishing to deter hate speech on their 
campuses will need to review Supreme Court precedents, especially 
Chaplinsky, R.A.V., and Black, to identify how to achieve the goal while 
respecting speakers’ First Amendment rights.  International norms, while 
not binding on American courts, provide advisory insight for colleges 
wishing to balance the dignity rights of those targeted by hate speech and 
the liberty rights of speakers.163  There are recent signs of some Supreme 
Court justices’ willingness to consider international legal standards.  In 
Lawrence v. Texas, a case recognizing the constitutional value of 
consensual, adult sexual intimacy,164 and Roper v. Simmons,165 invalidating 
the death penalty in cases involving juvenile offenders,166 the majority of 
the Court demonstrated an openness to international norms.167  
Throughout the world, democracies recognize that on campuses and at 
other public places hate speech can be suppressed because it poses a social 
threat and does not constitute a form of legitimate political debate.  The 
general trend is to balance the rights of speakers against the interests of 
persons who are the targets of hateful statements.168  In this area of law, 
countries that bar the use of racial and ethnic incitement tend to follow 
                                                                                                                          
163 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas have been the most opposed to the 
incorporation of international precedents into American constitutional interpretation.  For example, see 
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008), in which Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, 
asserted that “not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law 
enforceable in United States courts”; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), in which Justice Scalia deemed the majority’s “discussion of these foreign views” to be 
“meaningless dicta”; and Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring), in 
which Justice Thomas stated that “jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on 
Americans.” 
164 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572–73 (referring to a decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights on consensual homosexual conduct). 
165 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
166 Id. at 578. 
167 See, e.g., id. at 575–78 (detailing international norms against juvenile capital punishment). 
168 Defamation cases clearly balance the value of speech against individuals’ right to their good 
reputation.  See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (barring public 
officials’ recovery of damages for defamatory falsehoods absent proof that the speaker made the 
statement with “actual malice”); cf. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (setting a 
balancing standard in right-to-attorney cases); William Funk, Intimidation and the Internet, 110 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 579, 593 (2006) (“First Amendment doctrine, however, generally avoids applying . . . 
implicit balancing to new cases.”). 
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international standards of civility.  Typically, the balance is struck more in 
favor of the victims’ rights, in contrast to the United States’ inclination 
towards the interests of speakers. 
The international trend began in the aftermath of World War II, when 
the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  It obligates 
signatory states to punish the “[d]irect and public incitement to commit 
genocide.”169  Not satisfied with the rather limited scope of the Genocide 
Convention, multiple members of the United Nations broadened the 
coverage through the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination.  The latter convention requires signatories to punish 
“all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, [and] 
incitement to racial discrimination.”170  The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights is yet another relevant international agreement.  
It requires that “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence” be 
“prohibited by law.”171 
In response to the virtual ubiquity of the Internet,172 the most recent 
expansion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been the 
Council of Europe’s Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, 
Concerning the Criminalization of Racist and Xenophobic Acts Committed 
Through the Operation of Computer Systems.173  This convention requires 
signatory countries to pass laws prohibiting the manipulation of electronic 
transmission devices to intentionally threaten or insult people who “(i) . . . 
belong to a group, distinguished by race, colour, descent or national or 
ethnic origin, as well as religion, if used as a pretext for any of these 
factors, or (ii) a group of persons which is distinguished by any of these 
                                                                                                                          
169 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature 
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). 
170 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for 
signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S 195, 220 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). 
171 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 
I.C.C.P.R. art. 20, ¶ 2 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).  
172 See Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet, 38 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 817, 818 (2001) [hereinafter Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace] (describing the globalized 
reach and influence of the Internet with respect to communications, knowledge, employment 
opportunities, and so on). 
173 For additional details about the treaty, see Knechtle, supra note 82, at 48–49; Yulia A. 
Timofeeva, Hate Speech Online: Restricted or Protected? Comparison of Regulations in the United 
States and Germany, 12 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 253, 265–66 (2003).  U. N. Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon issued a statement in 2009 asking the Internet industry to “help ensure that hate speech does 
not proliferate online.”  Press Release, U.N. Dep’t of Pub. Info., Secretary-General, at Seminar on 
Cyberhate, Spells out Steps Taken To Protect Children from “Digital Demonization,” Make 
Cyperspace Safer for Youth (June 16, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/ 
docs/2009/sgsm12319.doc. 
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characteristics.”174  A glaring weakness of these four protocols is that none 
of them include sexual orientation as a protected class. 
These international norms have been incorporated into laws and mores 
of numerous democratic countries.  Part II of this Article described hate 
speech attacks recently occurring at American universities; internationally, 
universities face similar concerns about the dissemination of hate speech.  
Five Canadian university presidents and vice presidents have recently 
networked to develop a policy against expressing antisemitic sentiments 
cloaked under the guise of anti-Zionism.175  During a recent meeting of the 
Canadian Political Science Association, some members of the audience 
accused a professor of using hate speech against the nation’s aboriginal 
tribes, raising the question of whether college administrators could resolve 
the dispute.176 
The United Kingdom has witnessed a rise in campus antisemitic 
speech.177  British Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a directive requiring 
“universities to stop anti-Jewish ideology from taking root on 
campuses.”178  So much complacency had been shown, that the English 
                                                                                                                          
174 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts 
of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Systems, opened for signature Nov. 
23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 189. 
175 Toronto Universities Confer with FSWC to Help Protect Jewish Students in Response to Hate-
Filled Week, MARKETWIRE (Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/Toronto-
Universities-Confer-With-FSWC-Help-Protect-Jewish-Students-Response-Hate-Filled-956582.htm; 
see also Frances Kraft, Jewish Students Kept Tabs on Anti-Israel Event, CANADIAN JEWISH NEWS, Feb. 
10, 2005, at 45 (concerning a university investigation of a hate speech complaint); Fred M. Hoppe, 
Letter to the Editor, No More Hate Speech, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Hamilton, Ont.), Mar. 15, 2008, 
available at http://www.thespec.com/opinion/letters/article/168967 (stressing the need to ban hate 
speech from the McMaster University campus). 
176 Alexandra Shimo, Tough Critique or Hate Speech?, MACLEAN’S, Mar. 2, 2009, at 42. 
177 Adam Pike, UK Jewish Students Get Some Out-of-Class Lessons, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 18, 
2009, available at http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=136399.  One of the most prominent 
facets of recent British antisemitic activities has been the effort to boycott Israeli academics.  The 
University and College Union, a trade union of universities, formally invited a person whom the South 
Africa Human Rights Commission had convicted for using “anti-Zionism to excuse, apologize for, and 
ultimately align with antisemitic agitators.”  David Schraub, South Africa Conveys a Message Back to 
Bongani Masuku, MODERATE VOICE (Dec. 6, 2009), http://themoderatevoice.com/55315/south-africa-
conveys-a-message-back-to-bongani-masuku.  Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to detonate 
a bomb on an airplane headed to the United States, had been president of the University College of 
London’s Islamic Society.  He is reported to have been deeply influenced by a radical Islamic cleric, 
Anwar al-Awlaki, who gave a series of speeches at British universities.  Patrick Sawer & David Barrett, 
Detroit Bomber’s Mentor Continues to Influence British Mosques and Universities, TELEGRAPH 
(U.K.), Jan 2, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-
uk/6924653/Detroit-bombers-mentor-continues-to-influence-British-mosques-and-universities.html. 
178 Denis MacShane, The New Anti-Semitism, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2007, at A17.  Prosecutors 
are empowered to bring causes of action “against Islamic extremists for speeches on student campuses” 
under British Public Order Act 1986.  Colin Brown, Warning over Islamic Extremists Operating in 
Universities, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 28, 2007, at 6.  A recent parliamentary report from the 
House of Commons “highlighted attacks on undergraduates, a lack of respect by lecturers and tutors for 
the needs of observant Jewish students and a growing tolerance of extreme language against Israel 
during student debates on the Middle East.”  Isabel Oakeshott & Chris Gourlay, Anti-Semitism Rules 
Come in at Universities, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Mar. 25, 2007, available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/education/article1563917.ece. 
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government decided to “warn vice-chancellors they must not ignore 
antiJewish [sic] activity on campuses and must prevent prejudiced 
lecturers, guest speakers and extremist political organisations [from] 
stirring up hatred against Israel.”179  Marking a similar trend, the German 
government accused a group with a substantial Muslim membership in 
German universities of “propagating antisemitism and urging violence 
against Jews.”180  The German government has been particularly leery of 
this antisocial form of student behavior because of its own perilous history 
with antisemitic and anti-democratic student organizations,181 and because 
Germany pursues a policy meant to prevent the acceptance of antisemitism 
in universities as it is “‘throughout the Arab Middle East.’”182  
The Canadian Ministry of the Attorney General can rely on several 
Canadian laws prohibiting hate speech.  The Canadian Supreme Court has 
distinguished hate speech from protected speech.  It has articulated the 
purpose of constitutional protections for speech to be the protection of core 
values of “(1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting self-
fulfilment [sic] of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and 
ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political 
process is open to all persons.”183  The Supreme Court of Canada has 
determined that hate speech is incompatible with these values.184  While 
free speech is a quintessentially fundamental right, its centrality for 
individual self-governance is compatible with “reasonable limits 
prescribed by law” as long as they are necessary for maintaining “a free 
                                                                                                                          
179 Oakeshott & Gourlay, supra note 178. 
180 Richard Bernstein, German Police Raid an Islamic Militant Group, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 
2003, at A9; see also Peter Finn, Germany Bans Islamic Group; Recruitment of Youths Worried 
Officials, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2003, at A14 (reporting that the German government banned an 
Islamic group “accused of spreading violent antisemitism on [German] university campuses and 
establishing contacts with neo-Nazis”). 
181 RICHARD J. EVANS, THE COMING OF THE THIRD REICH 426–31 (2003) [hereinafter EVANS, 
THIRD REICH].  Antisemitism also spilled into university organizations, influencing the attitudes of 
future leaders.  The Union of German Students enjoyed large-scale support among students and 
provided a forum for spreading racism to budding intellectuals and teachers.  NANCY THORNDIKE 
GREENSPAN, THE END OF THE CERTAIN WORLD: THE LIFE AND SCIENCE OF MAX BORN 165 (2005); 
Konrad H. Jarausch, Keynote Address: The Expulsion of Jewish Professors and Students from the 
University of Berlin During the Third Reich, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES: THE EXCLUSION AND 
INCLUSION OF MINORITIES IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 9, 16 (Larry Eugene Jones ed., 
2001); Herman Jacobsohn, Effects of the War on Jews, REFORM ADVOC., July 30, 1921, at 760, 761.  
One of the students’ often-repeated complaints was that Jews enrolled in secondary schools and 
universities at a higher rate than their proportion to the population, increasing competition in the job 
market.  JACOB KATZ, FROM PREJUDICE TO DESTRUCTION: ANTI-SEMITISM, 1700–1933, at 263 (1980). 
182 David G. Dalin, Hitler’s Mufti, FIRST THINGS, Aug.–Sept. 2005, at 14, 14; see also Ernest 
Mabuza, Malema’s Hate Speech Case Postponed, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.), June 6, 2009 (“In a country[, 
South Africa,] that records some of the highest figures for sexual violence in the world, it is particularly 
irresponsible for a political leader to be reinforcing both silence as well as attitudes that tolerate and 
condone acts of sexual violence . . . .”). 
183 Sierra Club of Can. v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, para. 75 (Can.). 
184 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 699 (Can.). 
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and democratic society.”185 
Canada’s expositive definition of “hate speech” is pertinent even 
though it is broader than the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Black.  
Canada is openly willing to examine whether a hateful statement against an 
identifiable group is harmful to a pluralistic society, while the United 
States is only willing to place limitations on speech that intentionally 
incites harmful conduct.186  In a case dealing with telephonically 
transmitted hate speech, the Canadian Supreme Court explained the 
importance of limiting speech that vilifies individuals.187  The explanation 
is pertinent to universities identifying unacceptable speech in a multiethnic 
campus setting: 
[M]essages of hate propaganda undermine the dignity and 
self-worth of target group members and, more generally, 
contribute to disharmonious relations among various racial, 
cultural and religious groups, as a result eroding the tolerance 
and open-mindedness that must flourish in a multicultural 
society which is committed to the idea of equality.188 
While barring verbal attacks against individual dignity will not survive 
the Black test, Canadian jurisprudence is compatible with U.S. defamation 
case law.  A foremost purpose of group and individual defamation law is 
the protection of an individual’s or a group’s public reputation.189  The 
U.S. Supreme Court considers an “individual’s right to the protection of 
his own good name” to be grounded in “‘our basic concept of the essential 
                                                                                                                          
185 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, § 1, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). 
186 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362–63 (2003) (suggesting that the federal and state 
governments may ban “‘threats of violence’” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 
(1992))); Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 751 (“The derision, hostility and abuse encouraged by hate propaganda 
therefore have a severely negative impact on the individual’s sense of self-worth and acceptance.  This 
impact may cause target group members to take drastic measures in reaction, perhaps avoiding 
activities which bring them into contact with non-group members or adopting attitudes and postures 
directed towards blending in with the majority.  Such consequences bear heavily in a nation that prides 
itself on tolerance and the fostering of human dignity through, among other things, respect for the many 
racial, religious and cultural groups in our society.”).   
187 Canada (Human Rights Comm’n) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (Can.).   
188 Id. at 922. 
189 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 cmts. a–b (1979) (differentiating the types of 
damage to reputation allowing the target to recover without showing any other damages from others 
that do not allow for recovery without additional economic or pecuniary losses on the forms of 
defamation that result in reputational harms); David A. Elder, Small Town Police Forces, Other 
Governmental Entities and the Misapplication of the First Amendment to the Small Group Defamation 
Theory—A Plea for Fundamental Fairness for Mayberry, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 881, 933 (2004) 
(stating that the Supreme Court finds equally compelling the need to provide redress for reputational 
harms and the need to protect freedom of expression); Thomas David Jones, Human Rights: Freedom 
of Expression and Group Defamation Under British, Canadian, Indian, Nigerian and United States 
Law—A Comparative Analysis, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 427, 586 (1995) (noting that when 
defamation harms a group’s reputation and social esteem, it often leads to aggressive conduct against 
that group’s members). 
 2010] BURNING CROSSES ON CAMPUS 649 
dignity and worth of every human being.’”190  College administrations can 
protect the higher educational experience of individuals to freely exchange 
ideas on campus without being harassed by racists, xenophobes, sexists, 
homophobes, or ethnocentrists and without running afoul of the First 
Amendment’s injunctions.   
With the advent of the Internet, university computer equipment can 
also be used to spread propaganda attacking a group’s purported racial, 
religious, or ethnic inferiority.  Canada has confronted a similar problem of 
hate purveyors, like Ernst Zundel and Heritage Front,191 who used the 
Internet to inflame prejudice and spread discrimination.  The Canadian 
Human Rights Act of 2001 addresses the increasingly common 
transmission of information through the Internet and is applicable to 
threatening or defamatory student speech.192  The law contains a provision 
for penalizing anyone who repeatedly uses telecommunications devices, 
including the Internet, to expose people “to hatred or contempt” based on 
their “race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual 
orientation, marital status, family status, disability [or] conviction for 
which a pardon has been granted.”193  Prior to the addition of the section 
addressing Internet communications, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld 
restraints on telephonic dissemination of hate speech.  The Court came to 
its conclusion after balancing freedom of speech with other human rights 
obligations.194  Extrapolating the Court’s reasoning to the campus hate 
speech debate, regulations against hate propaganda may be adopted in 
Canada to better promote “equal opportunity unhindered by discriminatory 
practices.”195 
France, like the United States and Canada, intrinsically values free 
speech, asserting, in its declaration of rights, “[t]he free communication of 
ideas and opinions” to be “one of the most precious of the rights of 
                                                                                                                          
190 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 
75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
191 See Charlie Gillis, Righteous Crusader or Civil Rights Menace?, MACLEAN’S, Apr. 21, 2008, 
at 22 (writing about the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s hearings dealing with the Heritage Front’s 
hate messages); Mary Gusella, Chief Comm’r, Canadian Human Rights Comm’n, A Serious Threat, 
Opening Address: Hate on the Internet Conference (Dec. 15–16, 2005), in CANADIAN ISSUES, Spring 
2006, at 5–6 (describing Zundel’s spread of group defamation on the Internet); Jail for German 
Holocaust Denier, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 16, 2007, at 24 (mentioning Zundel’s conviction in 
Germany for Holocaust denial); Warren Kinsella, The Racist Face of SARS, MACLEAN’S, Apr. 14, 
2003, at 60 (describing how a “supporter of the pro-Nazi Heritage Front” relied on the Internet). 
192 On the regulation of Internet hate speech, see Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace, supra note 172, at 
820; Alexander Tsesis, Prohibiting Incitement on the Internet, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 6 (2002). 
193 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, §§ 3(1), 13(1)–13(2) (Can.). 
194 Canada (Human Rights Comm’n) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (Can.) (“It can thus be 
concluded that messages of hate propaganda undermine the dignity and self-worth of target group 
members and, more generally, contribute to disharmonious relations among various racial, cultural and 
religious groups, as a result eroding the tolerance and open-mindedness that must flourish in a multi-
cultural society which is committed to the idea of equality.”). 
195 Id. at 895.   
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man.”196  Yet a student, faculty member, or visitor to a French university 
who uses the Internet to send hateful messages, create discriminatory 
webpages, or post comments on a newsgroup can be criminally prosecuted 
for abusing that freedom.  The threat of hate speech is taken so seriously in 
France that it even requires Internet service providers (“ISPs”) to “assist 
law enforcement officers in eliminating online material that justifies crimes 
against humanity, incites racial hatred or can be classified as child 
pornography.”197  As the French government explains, the “precious” value 
of “free communication of thoughts and opinions” does not preclude the 
government from punishing the “incitement to discrimination, hatred and 
violence.”198  This legal sensibility, which is meant to preserve democratic 
institutions, precludes the use of traditional free speech forums, including 
newspapers, parks, and universities, from being converted into podiums of 
defamation and incitement to harm.199  It also has implications for 
regulating digital communication. 
The Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris has established precedent 
that allows for the criminal prosecution of hateful Internet content even 
when its source is extraterritorial.200  Plaintiffs, who included the union for 
French Jewish Students, alleged that, by allowing the posting of hyperlinks 
to auctions of Nazi memorabilia on its search engine, Yahoo! violated 
R645-1 of the French Criminal Code.201  The French court asserted 
jurisdiction and rendered judgment over the corporation even though 
Yahoo!’s computer servers were located in California.  The court found 
that it had the power to adjudicate the case because there was a “domestic 
effect[]” in France of prohibited content that was accessible to French web 
                                                                                                                          
196 DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN art. 11 (Fr. 1789). 
197 Lyombe Eko, New Medium, Old Free Speech Regimes: The Historical and Ideological 
Foundations of French & American Regulation of Bias-Motivated Speech and Symbolic Expression on 
the Internet, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 69, 102–03 n.208 (2006).  French ISPs agreed to 
filter materials depicting “child pornography, terrorism, or hate speech.”  Derek E. Bambauer, 
Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 401 (2009).  German law also allows for holding ISPs liable for 
allowing users access to hate sites on the Internet.  Timofeeva, supra note 173, at 264. 
198 France in the United Kingdom: Freedom of Speech in the French Media, FRENCH EMBASSY 
(May 24, 2007), http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Freedom-of-speech-in-the-French.html. 
199 Loi no. 90-615 du 13 juillet 1990 tendant à réprimer tout acte raciste, antisémite ou xénophobe 
[Law no. 90-615 of July 13, 1990 to suppress all racist, antisemite, or xenophobic acts], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 14, 1990, p. 
8333.  For an elaboration on a challenge made to the French law against Holocaust Denial, see 
Faurisson v. France, Decisions U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 550/1993, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (1996), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/ 
VWS55058.htm.    
200 The Tribunal’s decision in the original French, with an English translation, can be found at 
Appendix to the Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et 
l’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 
399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005).   
201 Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1184. 
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surfers.202  Another well-known French case involved the conviction of 
Robert Faurisson, a prominent Holocaust denier.203  In that case the 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris found it had jurisdiction over the 
criminal case, even though Faurisson had published his postings on a 
server located in the United States.204  This was similar to the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission’s order requiring white supremacist Ernst 
Zundel to remove antisemitic statements from his California-based website 
that was nevertheless accessible in Canada.205  These precedents allow 
French and Canadian courts to adjudicate cases where hateful materials 
that give rise to causes of action are originally posted on American college 
servers, far outside the countries’ geographic boundaries. 
German courts have likewise determined that they have the authority 
to render judgments against hateful messages that can be accessed in that 
country even though they were posted extraterritorially.  Hate speech 
originating on U.S. campuses may therefore be subject to German criminal 
penalties.  Germany’s highest criminal and civil court, the Federal Court of 
Justice, recently found that Gerald Fredrick Töben, the founder of the 
Adelaide Institute, could be imprisoned once he arrived in Germany even 
though his Holocaust denial was written on and posted from a computer 
located outside of Germany.206  The court established that it had 
jurisdiction over the case because Töben had made his statements easily 
accessible to Germans through the Internet.207  Töben’s web posting 
violated German criminal law because, as the court found, his distorted 
statements about history disturbed the peace and contaminated the political 
climate by making light of Nazi atrocities.208  The court sentenced him to 
ten months in prison.209  More recently, in July 2009, Germany’s Justice 
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204 Maria Luisa Fernández Esteban, The Internet: A New Horizon for Race Hatred, in 
DISCRIMINATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF RACISM 77, 103 (Sandra Fredman ed., 2001).  
More recently the French Interior Minister announced that government negotiators had developed a 
plan for French ISPs to filter sites containing racist speech.  Bambauer, supra note 197, at 401. 
205 Georgios I. Zekos, State Cyberspace Jurisdiction and Personal Cyberspace Jurisdiction, 15 
INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 1, 36 (2007). 
206 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Dec. 12, 2000, docket number 1 STR 
184/00 (Ger.), available at http://www.hrr-strafrecht.de/hrr/1/00/1-184-00.pdf.  Gerald Fredrick Töben 
was a South Australian who set up a Holocaust denial organization known as the Adelaide Institute.  
Emma Alberici, Alleged Australian Holocaust Denier Arrested (Austrl. Broad. Corp. television 
broadcast Oct. 1, 2008). 
207 Yulia A. Timofeeva, Worldwide Prescriptive Jurisdiction in Internet Content Controversies: A 
Comparative Analysis, 20 CONN. J. INT’L L. 199, 206–07 (2005). 
208 Id. at 206.   
209 Terri Judd, Holocaust Revisionist Held at Heathrow, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 2, 2008, at 
14.  In 2008, Scotland Yard’s extradition unit arrested Töben in London at the Heathrow airport on a 
European Union arrest warrant that German authorities had issued.  Id.  A British district court judge 
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Minister urged foreign ISPs to enforce their policies against spreading far-
right ideologies.210 
The applicability of German, Canadian, and French hate speech laws 
to extraterritorial defendants means that litigants in those countries can 
effectively sue people who post hate speech on computers housed at 
American universities.  Even though Germany, Canada, and France will 
apply their own laws to those cases, enforcement of judgments against the 
purveyors of hate speech will prove difficult.  The United States’ free 
speech doctrine is more libertarian, placing greater emphasis on expressive 
autonomy than many European nations, and thus raising substantive 
recovery problems.211  Ordinarily, U.S. courts enforce foreign judgments, 
but they will not do so where the original judgment violates a party’s U.S. 
constitutional rights.212  A potential international comity dispute with the 
French court was recently avoided when Yahoo! sought a declaratory 
judgment from a federal court to prevent the enforcement of the judgment 
of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, claiming that enforcement of 
its judgment would violate the company’s First Amendment rights.213  
While the district court had entered a summary judgment for Yahoo!, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed en banc, ultimately dismissing the case for lack of 
ripeness, thereby avoiding the First Amendment and due process issues.214  
                                                                                                                          
ruled the warrant to be invalid and ordered Töben’s release.  “Holocaust Denier” Wins Fight Against 
Extradition, DAILY MAIL (London), Oct. 30, 2008, at 43. 
210 Germany: Ban Neo-Nazi Sites from Abroad, JERUSALEM POST, June 9, 2010, available at 
http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=148187.  The German Multimedia Law punishes ISPs 
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possible and can be reasonably expected.’”  Courtney Macavinta, U.S. Weighs German ISP Law, 
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1033_3-201212.html; see also Justus Reid Weiner, Referral of Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad and Iran to the United Nations for Incitement to Commit Genocide and Other Charges, 3 
INT’L J. PUNISHMENT & SENT’G 1, 17–18 n.100 (2007) (“Decisions by the German courts have 
prompted ISPs to block access to sites containing hate speech or symbols of hate speech.”).  Germany’s 
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like U.S.-based CompuServe or German Webcom, with prosecution for failing to self-police their 
services for hate speech.  PETER JEPSON, TACKLING MILITANT RACISM 131 (2003); Shamoil 
Shipchandler, Note, The Wild Wild Web: Non-Regulation as the Answer to the Regulatory Question, 33 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 435, 445–46 (2000). 
211 See Tsesis, Boundaries, supra note 82, at 160 (“United States free speech jurisprudence is 
anomalous. . . .  [H]ere in the U.S. . . . intolerance and persecution can exist alongside free speech.”). 
212 See, e.g., Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 249 (Md. 1997) (finding that enforcement of 
a foreign defamation judgment would have been contrary to public policy); Abdullah v. Sheridan 
Square Press, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 2515 (LLS), 1994 WL 419847, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994) 
(dismissing a cause of action because establishment of a claim under British defamation law would run 
afoul of the defendants’ First Amendment rights). 
213 Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 
2006) (per curiam); see also id. at 1220 (“[T]he harm to First Amendment interests—if such harm 
exists at all—may be nowhere near as great as Yahoo! would have us believe.”). 
214 Id. at 1201; see also Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 
1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2004) (asserting that because it benefitted financially from its commercial dealings 
in France, “Yahoo! cannot expect both to benefit from the fact that its content may be viewed around 
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Even an unenforceable victory, however, can have communicative value, 
deterring further publication on the Internet of hate materials on college 
computers that degrade protected groups.  While Yahoo! disputed the 
order, it independently began blocking the sale of Nazi paraphernalia to 
French users of its popular search engine.215    
German penal provisions are part of a democratic system of 
governance that provides a constitutional guarantee to enjoy “the right 
freely to express and disseminate” ideas.216  To further underscore the 
importance of free speech, the German Constitution, known as the Basic 
Law, prohibits censorship.217  On the other hand, restraints on symbols that 
degrade historically vulnerable groups do not constitute an intrusion on 
democratically protected freedoms.218  Universities in Germany, in addition 
to other components of the country’s social apparatus, are responsible for 
preventing discourse from being used to instigate the mass violence that 
was part and parcel of the Nazi era.219  While German history is unique and 
its legal sensibilities are particularly heightened to any racist 
communications that are likely to stoke popular antisemitism, the United 
States’ history with slavery and Jim Crow laws also points to the need for 
restrictions on the use of intimidating forms of hatred.220 
European and Canadian speech laws emphasize the government’s role 
in prosecuting violations of human dignity.  The first Article of the 
German Basic Law, for example, imposes a national obligation to “respect 
and protect” “[h]uman dignity.”221  A scholar pointed out that Germany’s 
“balancing [of] human dignity and freedom of expression” is more attuned 
with Western democracies than “America’s robust free speech 
protection.”222 
In the United States, the Virginia v. Black model recognizes the state’s 
power to enforce criminal hate speech laws that prohibit intentional 
                                                                                                                          
the world and to be shielded from the resulting costs—one of which is that, if Yahoo! violates the 
speech laws of another nation, it must wait for the foreign litigants to come to the United States to 
enforce the judgment before its First Amendment claim may be heard by a U.S. court”), vacated, 399 
F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005). 
215 Orin S. Kerr, Enforcing Law Online, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 745, 747 (2007).  
216 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC 
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I art. 5(1) (Ger.), translated in BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
OF GERMANY 14 (Christian Tomuschat & David P. Currie trans., 2008) [hereinafter BASIC LAW], 
available at https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf.   
217 Id.  
218 Id. 
219 Antonio Brown, Academic Freedom in Western Europe: Right or Privilege?, in ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM AT THE DAWN OF A NEW CENTURY 115, 124 (Evan Gerstmann & Matthew J. Streb eds., 
2006). 
220 See TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 26, at 11, 25–28, 39–48 (discussing the 
centrality of hate speech in Nazi Germany and the antebellum American South). 
221 GG, BGBl. I art. 1(1), translated in BASIC LAW, supra note 216, at 13. 
222 Guy E. Carmi, Dignity—The Enemy from Within: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis of 
Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 957, 988 (2007). 
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intimidation; however, R.A.V.’s stricture against criminalizing simply 
offensive speech would likely render unconstitutional any dignity 
protection statutes.223  Despite the difference between the American and 
German doctrinal treatments—with the United States being less inclined to 
follow international standards for curbing genocidal and deprecatory 
statements—dignity is by no means incompatible with our case law.  But 
in America dignity is protected by civil statutes, rather than by criminal 
laws as it is in Europe.  The Supreme Court in the seminal case on private 
defamation explicitly stated that defamation law is meant to safeguard 
“‘our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human 
being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.’”224 
Germany recognizes that disparaging remarks based on race and 
ethnicity are social offenses, not merely personal affronts.  To that end, a 
German criminal provision prohibits the distribution of any “written 
materials . . . which describe cruel or otherwise inhuman acts of violence 
against human . . . beings in a manner expressing glorification or which 
downplays such acts of violence or which represents the cruel or inhuman 
aspects of the event in a manner which violates human dignity.”225 
German law has much to teach about democratic standards of 
governance that do not interfere with core principles of free speech.  Its 
law prohibits: (1) incitement to hate directed at a segment of the 
population; (2) advocacy to take “violent or arbitrary measures against 
them”;226 and (3) insults maliciously exposing others to contempt.227  In 
finding these standards to be constitutional, the German Constitutional 
Court has balanced constitutional provisions against individual liberties in 
a way that also makes sense in university settings.  The state government in 
Munich brought an action under the Public Assembly Act against 
Holocaust denier David Irving for a speech he gave before the National 
Democratic Party of Germany.228  The Court found the law did not violate 
Basic Law Article 5(1)’s protection for the open expression of public 
opinions.229  Its decision differentiated between opinions, which are 
subjective, unverifiable statements, and statements of fact.  Factually false 
statements about the Holocaust enjoy no constitutional or statutory 
protections in Germany because they are “untrue and cause[] harm to the 
                                                                                                                          
223 See supra notes 134–39 and accompanying text. 
224 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 
75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
225 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Dec. 2007, § 131(1) (Ger.), translated in THE 
GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE: A MODERN ENGLISH TRANSLATION 116 (Michael Bohlander trans., 2008). 
226 Id. § 130(1)(1). 
227 Id. § 130(1)(2). 
228 DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY 382–83 (2d ed. 1997). 
229 Id. at 383. 
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reputation and dignity of Holocaust survivors and their families.”230  
Holocaust denial insults Jews by disparaging their sincerity and veracity, 
making them the object of opprobrium.231 
A look at a few other cases will demonstrate how Germany 
differentiates a fact from an opinion.  A 1994 case that was also decided by 
the Constitutional Court established that the right to free speech does not 
protect individuals propagating the claim that the Auschwitz concentration 
camp never existed.232  A Berlin state court convicted a German neo-Nazi 
leader in 1995 for also teaching that Auschwitz was a lie because the claim 
spread “racial hatred and denigrat[ed] the state.”233  Contrast these two 
cases with the recitation of the opinion that Germany was not at fault for 
starting World War II, which is a protected form of speech.234 
Like Germany, England is more in accord with international 
understandings about foreseeable dangers hate speech poses to pluralistic 
order than is the United States.235  An English statute defines the spread of 
racial hatred to include disparagements about a person’s color, race, 
nationality, and ethnicity.236  To establish a prima facie case, a British 
prosecutor must prove that the defendant either meant for the abusive, 
threatening, or insulting words “to stir up racial hatred” or that “having 
regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up 
thereby.”237  Violations can occur in either public or private places, but not 
where the statements are made in a dwelling to others assembled there.238  
In 2006, an additional provision was added to the Act prohibiting the 
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spread of religious hatred.239  This is not to say that all religious criticism is 
culpable.  To the contrary, the amendment explicitly protects the 
expression of “antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular 
religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents.”240   
ISPs are required to contact the police National Community Tension 
Team; failure to do so and violation of the ISPs’ own terms of operation 
can result in their administrative removal.241  In another indication of 
progressive policymaking aimed at derogatory stereotyping, under the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act of 2008, sexual orientation is now a 
protected category.242 
Purposeful and negligent disparagements fit the British criminal 
definition of hate speech.  This differs from the United States, where only 
intentionally intimidating speech can be criminally punished.243  That is not 
to say that the negligent-fault conception of speech is wholly distinct from 
U.S. law, where civil penalties can attach for publicly spreading false 
defamation.244  In England and the United States, a university can punish 
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content, it will avoid liability.  Id.; see also Julia Hörnle, E-Collections & Legal Liability, UNIV. OF 
LONDON, http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/Portals/12/Documents/PDFs/JHornle.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 
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dghl/monitoring/ecri/legal_research/combat_racism_on_internet/CRI(2000)27.pdf. 
242 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, 2008, c. 4, § 74, sch. 16(a) (U.K.), available at 
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defamatory comments made in either a public dormitory meeting or on a 
college green.  In other words, universities can impose various disciplinary 
penalties without involving the criminal system. 
Australia is another member of the British Commonwealth with hate 
speech laws.  Its constitution does not explicitly mention the fundamental 
value of free speech, but its Supreme Court has long recognized it to be an 
implicit constitutional right.245  An Australian appellate court found that 
expressions meant to insult, humiliate, or intimidate others convey a 
realistic risk of harming the democratic society that places a high value on 
tolerance and political pluralism.246  The recognition of insults as outside 
the sphere of free speech goes beyond the U.S. precedents on hateful 
incitements.247  While university hate speech codes that prohibit the use of 
insults and humiliating statements are unlikely to survive U.S. judicial 
scrutiny because they would likely run afoul of the holding either in R.A.V. 
or in Black, Australia’s promotion of tolerance and pluralism is entirely 
compatible with American values.  Universities can promote collegiality 
on campuses by instituting anti-intimidation and group defamation 
provisions without running afoul of the First Amendment. 
Australia’s approach to instigative speech is consistent with that of 
European countries that have made the legislative connection between 
instigative speech and the instigation of harmful conduct.  They have 
differentiated between instigation to commit ordinary criminal violence 
and the expression of ideas or display of signs attacking vulnerable groups.  
Denmark’s criminal code prohibits the intentional dissemination of 
statements relating information that threatens, insults, or degrades a group 
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vilification laws in Australia were passed at differing times in various states.  For instance, in 1991, 
Queensland passed an anti-discrimination law against the advocacy of racial and religious hatred and, 
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Vilification Law, 21 AUSTL. B. REV. 204, 204 (2001).  The Victoria Act requires that the speaker intend 
for the vilification to be heard by a third party, not only by the individual at whom it is directed.  Anna 
Chapman & Kathleen Kelly, Australian Anti-Vilification Law: A Discussion of the Public/Private 
Divide and the Work Relations Context, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 203, 204 (2005).  Vilification is 
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247 The Australian balance between protecting free speech and prohibiting “racial vilification and 
hatred” is directly linked to international obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination.  Bropho, 204 A.L.R. at ¶¶ 57–62.   
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of persons “on account of their race, colour, national or ethnic origin, 
belief or sexual orientation.”248  Apparently, in recognition of the 
importance free speech plays in Denmark’s culture, the Danish Director of 
Public Prosecutions has decided that the provisions of that law should be 
read narrowly to prevent any interference with democratic institutions.249  
In practice, this cautious method means the law applies only when 
someone “‘might provoke in someone serious fear for his own or other 
persons’ lives, health or well-being, [or] threatens to commit a punishable 
act.’”250 
The rationale behind the Danish law has striking similarity to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s holding in Black.251  One Danish case arose from a cross 
burning incident “in the road outside a house” that the instigators “knew 
was inhabited by Turks.”252  This was reminiscent of the public cross 
burning that two of the three defendants in Black had perpetrated to 
intimidate a neighborhood resident.253  As in the U.S. case, the High Court 
for the Eastern Division of Denmark convicted the defendants because they 
chose the symbol for its historically intimidating message.254 
This case is distinct from circumstances involving the expression of 
the opinion that Danish and American universities cannot prohibit hate 
speech without infringing on individuals’ deep sense of freedom and self-
determination.  Protected opinion was involved in complaints from the 
Muslim Danish community regarding twelve cartoon images criticizing 
radical Islam.255  The Director of Public Prosecutions for Denmark decided 
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despite charges that the cartoons amounted to hate speech, such charges were unfounded, and that 
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not to proceed with criminal charges against the newspaper, presumably 
because there was no indication that they were extremely derogatory or 
posed any serious danger to the well-being of any group. 256  Similarly, to 
avoid running afoul of the First Amendment, a university community could 
only prosecute intimidating statements.  
Finland is another country that honors free expression,257 but its law 
nevertheless criminalizes the use of racial, ethnic, and religious threats, 
slanders, and insults.258  An author and two newspaper editors were fined 
in 2007 under Finland’s hate speech law for antisemitic remarks made in a 
published letter.259 
The Swedish Constitution explicitly guarantees all citizens the rights 
“publicly to express [their] thoughts, opinions and sentiments, and in 
general to communicate information on any subject whatsoever on sound 
radio, television and certain like transmissions, films, video recordings, 
sound recordings and other technical recordings.”260  A provision of the 
Swedish Penal Code, nevertheless, punishes anyone for spreading 
                                                                                                                          
“public discourse may not be restricted merely because it fails to conform to the religious principles of 
some members of the society”).  The cartoons were various.  They included (1) an image of 
Muhammad holding a walking stick trailed by a donkey laden with goods; (2) a depiction of 
Muhammad with a crescent moon halo made to look like satanic horns; (3) a caricature of his face with 
a crescent moon around it; (4) a man holding a knife with a sinister look and flanked by two women in 
burqas; (5) a drawing of a man standing in front of heaven saying, “Stop, stop, we have run out of 
virgins,” to suicide bombers; (6) a drawing mocking the paper in which the comics were published, 
with a school boy standing in front of a blackboard with the Arabic words, “‘Jyllands-Posten’s 
journalists are a bunch of reactionary provocateurs’”; (7) a caricature of an artist at a drawing table hard 
at work drawing Muhammad, with sweat dripping from his brow and looking over his shoulder in fear; 
(8) a lineup of various men in turbans, one with a complete halo around it, and a man trying to identify 
them, but saying he cannot tell them apart; (9) an abstract image with the caption, when translated: 
“Prophet you crazy bloke!  Keeping women under yoke[!]”; (10) a drawing of a man holding his hand 
to stop two sword- and bomb-wielding characters, saying “[r]elax guys, it’s just a drawing made by 
some infidel South Jutlander”; (11) a drawing of Muhammad in a turban containing a bomb; and (12) a 
thin-necked character with an orange in his turban with the words “PR stunt.”  Danish Muslim 
Cartoons, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY, http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/danish_muslim_cartoons/ (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2010); Row Deepens over Danish Cartoons, NONE OF THE ABOVE (Feb. 10, 2006), 
http://steelturman.typepad.com/thesteeldeal/2006/02/allah_cartoons_.html. 
256 See Edwin Jacobs, Cartoon Case: Denmark Will Not Prosecute, BRUSSELS J., Mar. 16, 2006, 
available at http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/915 (reporting that the Director upheld an earlier 
decision that the drawings received free speech protection, and noting the statements of a Danish 
prosecutor that expressions subjecting groups of persons to scorn and degradation on account of their 
religion or other characteristics did not constitute protected speech). 
257 CONST. ch. 2. § 12 (Fin.), available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en 
19990731.pdf. 
258 PENAL CODE ch. 11, § 8 (Fin.), available at http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/E8890039.PDF.  
Actionable statements can be made “verbally, in writing, by illustration or by gestures.”  Lot Klo, 
Mikko Ellilä, Ethnic Agitation, Preliminary Investigation, LAIVA ON TÄYNNÄ (Apr. 5, 2007, 7:02 PM), 
http://laivaontaynna.blogspot.com/search/label/english. 
259 FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2008: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL 
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 257 (Arch Puddington et al. eds., 2008); Finland, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
§ 2(c) (Mar. 11, 2008), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100558.htm. 
260 REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION] 1:1 (Swed.), available at http://www.riksdagen.se/ 
templates/R_PageExtended____6066.aspx.  An English translation of the Constitution may be found at 
http://www.riksdagen.se/templates/R_Page____6316.aspx. 
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“statements or communication[s]” that “threaten[] or express[] contempt 
for a national, ethnic or other such group of persons with allusion to race, 
colour, national or ethnic origin or religious belief.”261  A 2003 amendment 
to the law also criminalizes incitement against homosexuals.262  The 
Swedish Supreme Court, in a 2005 decision, upheld this law.  The opinion 
distinguished between “objective criticism of certain groups,” which the 
country’s constitution protects, and statements triggering criminal liability: 
“Naturally, the principles of freedom of speech and the right to criticize 
may not be used to protect statements expressing contempt for a group of 
people, for example, because they are of a certain nationality and hence are 
inferior.”263  Government restraints must  
never exceed that which is necessary in light of the purpose 
for which it is created, and may not go so far as to constitute 
a threat against the free exchange of opinions, which is one 
of the foundations of democracy, and may not be done only 
on the grounds of political, religious, cultural or other such 
philosophy.264   
The free exchange of even harsh criticism of groups on campuses and 
elsewhere is protected as long as it does not overstep the bounds of 
“objective and responsible discourse regarding the group in question,” but 
intentionally threatening messages or those expressed in contempt of the 
group are outside the scope of fundamental protections.265  The true threats 
provision of the Swedish decision is compatible with U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.266 
As in the United States and Sweden, merely opinionated racism or 
ethnocentrism is not actionable in Norway.  While access to information is 
“a cornerstone of Norwegian democracy,”267 this principle is not a bar 
against hate speech legislation.  Norwegian Penal Code Section 135a 
prohibits the intentional public use of racist, xenophobic, ethnocentric, and 
                                                                                                                          
261 BROTTSBALKEN [BRB] [CRIMINAL CODE] 16:8 (Swed.), available at http://www.sweden.gov. 
se/content/1/c6/02/77/77/cb79a8a3.pdf. 
262 Prosecutor Gen. v. Green, Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court] 2005-11-29 p. 4 
B1050-05 (Swed.), available at http://www.domstol.se/Domstolar/hogstadomstolen/Avgoranden/ 
2005/Dom_pa_engelska_B_1050-05.pdf.   
263 Id. 
264 Id. at p. 10.  The European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance has recommended 
that Sweden can continue guarding free speech while prosecuting and punishing racist, xenophobic, 
and antisemitic speech on the Internet.  EUROPEAN COMM’N AGAINST RACISM & INTOLERANCE, 
COUNCIL OF EUR., THIRD REPORT ON SWEDEN 32 (2004), http://hudoc.ecri.coe.int/XMLEcri/ 
ENGLISH/Cycle_03/03_CbC_eng/SWE-CbC-III-2005-26-ENG.pdf. 
265 Green, Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 2005-11-29, at p. 6. 
266 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003) (“[A] state, consistent with the First 
Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate.”). 
267 Kulturdepartementet (Ministry of Culture), Media in Norway (Aug. 31, 1996), 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/kkd/dok/veiledninger_brosjyrer/1996/Media-in-Norway.html?id= 
419207. 
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homophobic speech to threaten or insult others or to subject them to 
hatred.268 
This comparative analysis is meant to demonstrate that many 
democratic countries have criminal statutes punishing hate speech.  These 
countries have found that pluralism is furthered by protecting the dignitary 
rights of targeted groups.   
V.  FORMULATING CONSTITUTIONAL COLLEGE SPEECH CODES 
The reasoning in Virginia v. Black, which recognized states’ power to 
prohibit intimidating cross burning, resembled international policies on 
hate speech more than any other Supreme Court decision in this area of 
law.  The next case to reach the Supreme Court on the subject might 
expressly reflect on the lessons of foreign jurisprudence and how to protect 
free expression while prohibiting violent, group-based agitation.  In Black, 
the Court struck a delicate balance between the right of self-expression and 
the social dangers of true threats.  Integrity to the principles of the First 
Amendment involves respecting self-expression while preventing 
intimidation.  Intellectual freedom is particularly critical to a university’s 
mission to preserve an open educational atmosphere, but threatening 
discourse reviling particular groups of students detracts from their ability 
to participate in campus activities.  Hateful intimidation is particularly 
incompatible with the university’s role because it creates an insecure 
environment that detracts from students’ sense of safety.269  Regardless of 
                                                                                                                          
268 STRAFFELODN [PENAL CODE] 13:135a (Nor.).  A translation of section 135a is available at 
http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/1690/file/c428fe3723f10dcbcf983ed5914
5.htm/preview.  See EUROPEAN COMM’N AGAINST RACISM & INTOLERANCE, COUNCIL OF EUR., THIRD 
REPORT ON NORWAY (2004), at 27, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46efa2e52d.html (discussing 
Norway’s intention to establish “clear guidelines on how to carry out investigations in cases brought 
under Article 135a”); Gro Lindstad, Norway, INT’L GAY AND LESBIAN HUM. RIGHTS COMM’N, at 133, 
134 (2003), http://www.iglhrc.org/binary-data/ATTACHMENT/file/000/000/53-1.pdf (discussing 
section 135a as it pertains to hate speech directed at gays and lesbians); Royal Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Communication from Norway to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
Regarding the View in Communication No. 30/2003—The Jewish Communities in Oslo and 
Trondheim et al vs. Norway 2–3 (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ 
jd/prm/2006/0014/ddd/pdfv/273990-cerd_replynorway.pdf (describing how the Norwegian government 
has strengthened section 135a since 2004, providing the law with more effective provisions against 
racist and ethnocentric speech).  The applicable scienter standard for section 135a is found in section 40 
of the Penal Code.  STRAFFELODN [PENAL CODE] 3:40 (Nor.).  A translation of Section 40 is available 
at http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/1690/file/c428fe3723f10dcbcf983ed59 
145.htm/preview. 
269 The risk of intimidation is also high in grammar and high schools.  Several state and local laws 
prohibit it in public schools because of how much harassment detracts from the educational 
environment.  See 51 D.C. Reg. 3202 (2004) (finding that intimidation harms the educational 
environment); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424 (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring the Maryland Department 
of education to report occurrences of bullying, harassment, and intimidation creating a hostile 
educational environment); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2010) (prohibiting intimidating acts 
based on “race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and 
expression, or a mental, physical or sensory handicap, or by any other distinguishing characteristic” on 
school property).  
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whether an individual displays a swastika, burns a cross, or delivers a 
dehumanizing speech in a dormitory corridor or at a campus commons, the 
alienating effect is the same.  Those expressions of hatred are likely to 
instigate violence, alienate students, create deep racial and ethnic rifts, or 
make for a hostile learning environment.  These expressions of hatred are 
very different than a piece of art without any advocacy component.  The 
onus should be on the university’s administration to prove that the charged 
statements did intimidate or advocate discrimination, violence, or 
exclusion.  Parody, of course, would not fall under this definition since it 
enjoys First Amendment protections.270 
In balancing the interests of intimidated individuals and persons 
wishing to express prejudiced opinions, the United States’ free speech 
tradition provides public university officials with less latitude to punish 
group hatred than their administrative counterparts in countries like 
Canada, Germany, and England.  American jurisprudence is nevertheless 
in accord with international findings that virulent forms of hateful 
expressions pose a threat to public safety.  International norms and foreign 
laws on this subject suggest that hate speech is harmful to individuals as 
well as groups.  The risk of leaving hate speech unchecked on campuses is 
that the targets of violent communications remain vulnerable to more 
harassment.  Because targeted groups and individuals are often uncertain 
of their safety, they tend to be wary of pursuing the full breadth of 
available educational opportunities, trying to avoid locations and activities 
that might expose them to calumny or danger. 
Black provides answers to most arguments put forth by opponents of 
hate speech regulations.  Larry Alexander, for one, argues that hate speech 
is no more than verbal harm, conveying taunting ideas.271  Suzanna Sherry 
is similarly dismissive of the gravity of harms flowing from hate speech.  
She argues that regulation of it is driven by a political agenda that is 
“designed to improve the virtue of an unvirtuous population.”272  She 
criticizes the use of university hate speech codes for paternalistically 
enforcing virtuous behavior rather than allowing students to be self-
directed.273  John S. Greenup takes this argument one step further, arguing 
that university officials should grant organizations like the Ku Klux Klan 
access to university locations unless their activities pose overt threats.274  
This perspective recognizes the risk of intimidation, but fails to assess 
                                                                                                                          
270 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (holding that a parody of 
Reverend Jerry Falwell was protected under the First Amendment from tort liability). 
271 Alexander, supra note 3, at 91. 
272 Suzanna Sherry, Speaking of Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate 
Speech, 75 MINN. L. REV. 933, 936–37 (1991). 
273 Id. at 943–44. 
274 John S. Greenup, The First Amendment: Does Hate Speech Deserve Protection?, 34 J.L. & 
EDUC. 605, 612 (2005). 
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whether tolerating an avowed terrorist organization like the Ku Klux Klan 
on campus is threatening, divisive, and disruptive of teaching and 
learning.275 
The notion that counterspeech will adequately combat group hatred 
and promote civil liberties, and is sufficient to maintain tolerance on 
campus, which Nadine Strossen and the ACLU have advanced,276 has been 
roundly rejected by the international community.277  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has now endorsed the consensus perspective on free speech policy.  
Just as with sexual harassment in the workplace, counterspeech is an 
inadequate remedy for the direct, intimidating attack of hate speech.278  
Racism, chauvinism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia are too deeply 
embedded in culture to be changed overnight.  While public attitudes are 
being changed, hate speech continues to menace out-groups.  Telling a 
university employee subject to racial or sexual coercion, racial 
degradation, or ethnic insults to simply respond to antagonists provides 
victims no legal redress but mere platitudes.  Just as responding to 
comments in a hostile environment does not solve the problem of 
workplace harassment, neither does counterspeech decrease the risk posed 
by advocacy groups committed to carrying out a campus campaign of 
group intimidation, exclusion, and discrimination.  Expecting students at 
public universities to simply talk things out and convince those who 
intimidate them of the fallacy of their threatening words and behaviors 
fails to provide a procedurally cognizable way of seeking legal redress.  
The mantra of more speech is based on libertarian faith that the world 
                                                                                                                          
275 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 389 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“To me, the 
majority’s brief history of the Ku Klux Klan only reinforces this common understanding of the Klan as 
a terrorist organization, which, in its endeavor to intimidate, or even eliminate those it dislikes, uses the 
most brutal of methods.”).  Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Black actually sketches a history of the use 
of the burning cross for purposes other than intimidation.  Id. at 365–66 (majority opinion).  Her 
argument is weakest when it comes to the displays of terrorist groups, as these groups choose symbols 
to both menace and express their ideology, and far more convincing when it comes to using hate 
symbols for artistic depictions, as was the case with the film Mississippi Burning.  Id. at 366.  Even if a 
prosecutor must prove a cross burners’ frame of mind for burning a cross, the Klan’s use will 
invariably be linked to the organization’s history of persecuting opposition and minority groups.  See 
DAVID M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OF THE KU KLUX KLAN 272–73 (Duke 
Univ. Press 1987) (1965) (writing about how burning crosses would trigger melees); GLENN 
JEANSONNE & DAVID LUHRSSEN, A TIME OF PARADOX: AMERICA SINCE 1890, at 107–09 (2006) 
(discussing the Klan and its use of burning crosses in the 1920s); Glenn Feldman, Soft Opposition: 
Elite Acquiescence and Klan-Sponsored Terrorism in Alabama, 1946–1950, 40 HIST. J. 753, 777 
(1997) (discussing the Ku Klux Klan in post-World War II violence). 
276 Strossen, supra note 101, at 562–64; see also Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech, supra note 5, 
at 772.  
277 See supra Part III. 
278 See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 421–22 (“[T]o the extent we allow verbal conduct creating a hostile 
working atmosphere, we thereby refuse to protect persons from certain forms of private racial and 
sexual discrimination.  Conversely, to the extent that mere words can give rise to liability for 
employment discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or other causes of action, we 
acknowledge that an employer or co-worker can be punished for making such statements.”). 
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community discounted after it understood the effectiveness of antisemitic 
Nazi propaganda.279  It also elevates harassment and intimidation to an 
equal plane with dialogue.  To the contrary, the former is a means of 
disengagement with its reviled object, while the latter is a form of mutual 
engagement between the interlocutors. 
The potential harms are well illustrated by one of the most heinous 
cases of school hate speech.  Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris revealed their 
murderous intentions, laced with neo-Nazi terms, before their gruesome 
attack against fellow students at Columbine High School.280  Had a hate 
speech policy been in place, school officials might have stopped them from 
carrying out their plans.  The school did not take adequate notice of their 
wearing swastikas at school; writing essays about hatred, murder, and 
destruction; and presenting a class video project depicting their planned 
shooting spree.281  Similarly, Jeff Weise went on a murderous rampage at 
his Red Lake, Minnesota, high school after extensive racial supremacist 
comments he expressed at school and on websites like www.nazi.org.282 
Although not a hate speech case, the shooting spree at Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”) should be 
mentioned in this context because it demonstrates the real risk of 
administrative inaction.  Before Seung Hui Cho killed thirty-two and 
injured many others, he had written a story for his college creative writing 
class depicting a young man killing fellow students before committing 
suicide.283  Even though the creative writing professor informed university 
officials of his concern about the violent nature of the composition, 
university officials decided not to intervene.284  It became obvious that 
                                                                                                                          
279 See supra text accompanying note 106. 
280 Harris and Klebold regularly wore Nazi swastikas, spoke of committing acts of violence, and 
bragged about accumulating weapons.  Tom Weber, Values Key to Stopping Kid Violence, BANGOR 
DAILY NEWS (Me.), Oct. 12, 2006, at B1.  The young men also used Nazi salutes during bowling 
games.  Jodi Wilgoren, Eerie Parallels Are Seen to Shootings at Columbine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 
2005, at A12.  None of these things amounted to an imminent threat of conduct, but they could have 
been enough to prevent the young men’s conduct under the Virginia v. Black model proposed in this 
Article.  To prevent an attack similar to Harris and Klebold’s, officials at one school recently reported a 
student who threatened to shoot students at an indefinite time in the future and collected white 
supremacist material, which led to his arrest.  High School Tragedy Averted, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES 
(Fla.), Feb. 22, 2006, at 10A. 
281 In Brief, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 30, 2002, at 10A; Weber, supra note 280.  
282 Chris Maag & Sarah Sturmon, Jeff Weise Lost His Parents but Had Close Friends, TIME, Apr. 
4, 2005, at 35.  At school, other students often noticed Weise’s drawings of the Nazi swastika and his 
conversations about guns.  Id.  He repeatedly described his desire to achieve ethnic purification, which 
was known by other students.  Id. 
283 Kristen Gelineau, Earlier Warning Could Have Saved Lives at Va. Tech, CENTRE DAILY 
TIMES (State College, Pa.), Aug. 30, 2007. 
284 Sari Horwitz, Paper by Cho Exhibits Disturbing Parallels to Shootings, Sources Say, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 29, 2007, at A01.  The lack of imminent harm, typically needed to prevent the expression 
of violent ideology, seems to have brought officials at Virginia Tech to avoid confrontation with Cho.  
Joseph Berger, Deciding When Student Writing Crosses the Line, N. Y. TIMES, May 2, 2007, at B7.  
Using the Abrams v. United States model, officials might have feared penalizing Cho; they failed to 
understand that his words were true threats and, therefore, were unprotected by the First Amendment.  
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something should have been done.  If the facts are changed and a student 
writes a project publically extolling and advocating the eliminationist 
ideologies of the Nazi Party, the Khmer Rouge, the Ku Klux Klan, or 
radical Islamicism, or some such genocidal or violent organization, 
universities should have means of dealing with what may amount to 
realistic threats. 
The Supreme Court regards the expressive use of symbols denoting 
violence to be potentially dangerous enough for states to pass laws 
prohibiting their public display without running afoul of the First 
Amendment.285  While solely preventing the display of hateful symbols 
will not put an end to racist attitudes,286 the state university can prohibit 
intimidating, true threats.287  The criteria courts use for identifying whether 
a communication poses a serious threat of unlawful violence assesses an 
objective listener’s sense that the threatened violence will occur.288  The 
vitriolic speaker need not intend to commit the violence but only to 
intimidate listeners.289  A similar consideration should go into hate speech 
targeting an entire group, which threatens to harm any of its members. 
Allowing students or faculty members to intimidate others through 
hate symbols or expressions favors the bigots’ desire to advocate 
discrimination and violence while denying the victims’ reasonable 
expectation of security while on campus.290  The constitutional importance 
of the First Amendment to democratic governance and self-assertion does 
not extend to menacing messages that tend to diminish the targeted group’s 
sense of security and its ability to enjoy college commons areas and to 
attend university sponsored events.291  Students and faculty members are 
                                                                                                                          
Creative writing teachers have concerns about limiting speech different than constitutional scholars that 
center on the squelching of intellectually creative impulses.  April Simpson, Writing Professors Debate 
Line Between Creativity, Peril, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2007, at B3. 
285 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 354 (2003) (associating Klan violence with burning 
crosses). 
286 See Lee Ann Rabe, Note, Sticks and Stones: The First Amendment and Campus Speech Codes, 
37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 205, 226 (2003) (claiming that one problem with hate speech regulations is 
that “[d]riving racist, sexist, and other discriminatory speech underground will not necessarily 
eliminate a student’s thoughts and emotions”). 
287 See Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (per curiam) (reciting that the First Amendment permits a state to 
ban a “‘true threat’” (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969))). 
288 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 
F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1996) (“While courts may consider the effect on the listener when determining 
whether a statement constitutes a true threat, the final result turns upon whether a reasonable person in 
these circumstances should have foreseen that his or her words would have this effect.”).  
289 See Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60 (“The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.”). 
290 See Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis, 
24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1528 (2003) (arguing that the dangers hate speech poses should be based, 
in part, on the context in which they are uttered); Kevin W. Saunders, The Need for a Two (or More) 
Tiered First Amendment to Provide for the Protection of Children, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 257, 267–68 
(2004) (stressing that hate crimes indicate the danger racist communications can pose to a community). 
291 See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND 207 
(2004) (observing that the First Amendment may “d[o] little to protect” the targets of hate speech, who 
tend to “register[] their greatest advances when they act[] in defiance of the First Amendment”). 
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more likely to think twice before going to hear the college orchestra or 
heading to the student union if it requires walking through an area where a 
cross has recently been burned, a swastika has been displayed, or a 
supremacist rally has taken place.  Hate speakers are neither inviting 
intellectual debate and rejoinder nor seeking political dialogue.  Theirs is a 
campaign of silencing through intimidation—something that threatens the 
university’s “marketplace of ideas” and is no benefit to educational 
interactions.292  Academic freedom is not a license for harassment.  Neither 
does hate speech further the pursuit for truth: calling Jews vermin, blacks 
apes, women whores, Native Americans savages, Tutsis cockroaches, or 
Mexicans lazy has nothing to do with truth.  These derogatory statements 
are meant to exclude and stamp certain groups with the label of outsider to 
the university community.  Derisive speech becomes academically 
punishable when it is meant to defame, intimidate, threaten, terrify, or 
instigate violence.  
While Black provides college administrators with a good starting point 
for preventing the use of hate speech on campus, it does not go far enough 
in identifying expressive harms.  Justice O’Connor’s view for the plurality 
that the First Amendment protects ideologically-driven cross burning not 
meant to intimidate fails to recognize the symbol’s intrinsically social and 
political connections to the Ku Klux Klan’s history of racial violence and 
white supremacism.293  The supremacist “statement of ideology,” which 
she distinguishes from “intimidation,” symbolizes an organization’s effort 
and willingness to segregate and to create racially-polarized forums.294  
The same is true of other hate, exterminationist, or genocidal symbols—
such as swastikas or Hamas flags295—that are displayed on campus to 
                                                                                                                          
292 See Charles R. Lawrence III, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination 
Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 787, 792 (1992) (“Hate speech frequently silences 
its victims, who, more often than not, are those who are already heard from least.”). 
293 See Black, 538 U.S. at 365–66 (stating that some persons who burn crosses may intend to 
express a racist ideology rather than to intimidate, or may neither intend to elaborate an ideology nor to 
intimidate). 
294 I make this inference from the fact that Virginia’s cross burning statute had initially been 
enacted in 1952 to prevent the particularly virulent expression of support for Jim Crow laws.  See  
Brief of Petitioner, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107), 2002 WL 1885898 at *23–
24 (describing the grounds for the Virginia legislature’s adoption of the state cross burning statute).   
295 Hamas is a genocidal organization whose charter uses violent antisemitism, calling Jews “war 
mongers” who were behind all the world’s revolutions, World War I, Word War II, and other 
catastrophic human events.  The Hamas flag is just as ideologically violent as the swastika, relying on 
ancient Hadith to instigate mass murder: 
[T]he Hamas has been looking forward to implement Allah’s promise whatever time 
it might take.  The prophet [Muhammad], prayer and peace be upon him, said: The 
time [Judgment Day] will not come until Muslims will fight the Jews (and kill 
them); until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees, which will cry: O Muslim! 
[T]here is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him! 
Hamas Charter (1988), THE JERUSALEM FUND (last visited Oct. 24, 2010), 
http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html.  The 
presence of a Hamas flag signifies support for this genocidal plan. 
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advance an ideological agenda.  While the burning cross has a message 
specifically linked to group violence in the United States, the swastika 
symbolizes the worldwide effort to commit genocide against Jews and to 
subject other non-Aryans to subservience.  Its threatening message is 
unambiguous.  Further, many forms of hate speech are overtly 
dehumanizing, degrading, defamatory, and exclusionary.  
In formulating a university hate speech code, it is important to 
distinguish between disciplinary measures available to administrators and 
punishments connected to criminal convictions.  Educational penalties are 
designed to negatively impact a student’s or faculty member’s record, 
while criminal punishment is more onerous because it involves the 
curtailment of liberty and greater social stigma.  Educators can assess 
penalties without following any rules of criminal procedure.  The “beyond-
a-reasonable-doubt” standard is meant to prevent mistaken deprivations of 
liberty, something that is unconnected to college sanctions. 
Recognizing this contrast is important because the standard of proof 
for a criminal hate speech law, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
is significantly more rigorous than what would be required for the censure 
of student hate speech.  The O’Connor plurality’s requirement in Black 
applies within the context of criminal liability, not civil penalties.  If a 
college hate speech code prohibits the use of a prima facie presumption of 
a hate speaker’s mental state, requiring a clear showing of intent, the 
regulation would have no problem passing the plurality requirement.  
College administrators are likely to have more latitude, however, because 
this standard of proof applies to criminal cases, not administrative codes 
like those that govern college campuses’ activities. 
The most closely analogous standard of civil liability comes from 
defamation law.  In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court established that 
a private plaintiff seeking to recover damages for defamation about a 
public matter must prove that the defendant acted negligently.296  That is, 
liability for defamation only attaches in cases of negligent publication.297  
To withstand judicial review of adverse university decisions against hate 
                                                                                                                          
296 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). 
297 See id. at 347 (setting out the standard for liability for the defamation of private parties).  
Defamation cases involving public figures conviction requires a showing of “‘actual malice.’”  That 
standard can only be met if the speaker published a statement with the “knowledge that it was false” or 
the “reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–
80 (1964).  Following up with the definition, the Court explained that, unlike the reasonable prudence 
standard, “reckless disregard” occurs when a publisher actually “entertain[s] serious doubts as to the 
truth of his publication.”  St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).  Unlike private 
defamation, which is predicated on an objective standard, public defamation examines the publisher’s 
subjective state of mind.  Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989).  A 
plaintiff wishing to demonstrate the actual malice of a statement must present “clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant realized that his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained 
serious doubt as to the truth of his statement.”  Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 
466 U.S. 485, 511 n.30 (1984). 
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speakers, campus codes should include at least a negligence fault 
component.  This element must protect artistic and educational references 
to words and symbols that might otherwise be punishable.  The negligence 
standard is applicable to campus hate speech codes, which cover a greater 
set of expressions than the rather narrow tort of defamation.  To avoid 
running afoul of the First Amendment, the campus complainant would 
need to demonstrate the speaker’s negligence by a preponderance of the 
evidence.298  Such a standard would require proof that under the 
circumstances a reasonable speaker should have realized that hostile 
expressions based on people’s race, gender, religion, nationality, or sexual 
orientation were likely to intimidate or harm the reputation of a defined 
group or individual students.  Gertz is as interesting for what it says as for 
what it does not say: the Court retained a lower threshold for the private 
plaintiff to demonstrate liability in issues of public interest, but it placed no 
requirement for private parties to prove a culpable state of mind when they 
sue for defamation about private matters.299 
University hate speech codes can create different gradations of proof 
predicated on whether the hate speech is private or public and at whom it is 
directed.  The highest degree of proof and, perhaps, punishment would be 
linked to public matters about public figures.  Here are a few examples to 
clarify the distinctions: A fraternity that puts out a flier with racist epithets 
against a college administrator reviling her for increasing tuition would be 
making a statement about a public figure on a public matter.  Under these 
circumstances, defamation could only be proven, in accordance with 
Sullivan, upon proof of actual malice.  If the fraternity published a racist 
flier about a fellow student’s in-class statements about the tuition increase, 
that would rise to the level of the Gertz negligence standard.  Finally, if the 
flier contained a racially derogatory remark against a student, and the 
fraternity brothers had only overheard that student supporting tuition hikes 
while talking to his parents on the phone, the university could resort to a 
common law standard of defamation for adjudicating the appropriate 
disciplinary penalty. 
Defamation law had been established long before the decision in 
                                                                                                                          
298 See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–77 (1986) (finding, in a case where a 
newspaper published speech of public concern about a private figure, that “the Constitution requires us 
to tip [the scales] in favor of protecting true speech”).  The “substantial truth” of a statement can be 
offered as a defense.  Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516–17 (1991). 
299 Justice Powell, writing for a plurality of the Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., asserted that First Amendment protections that apply to statements about 
public matters are inapplicable in defamation suits brought by private parties to recover for defamatory 
statements about their private conduct.  472 U.S. 749, 758–62 (1985).  Applying this reasoning to the 
facts of the case, the Court held that a credit statement was an individual interest that was not a matter 
of public concern.  Id. at 761–62.  The case allows for state common law rules of defamation to apply 
to private-matter defamation.  See Roffman v. Trump, 754 F. Supp. 411, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (“[T]he 
[Supreme] Court has created few restrictions on state defamation law with respect to suits brought by 
private plaintiffs based on speech relating to issues of private concern.”). 
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Black.  That case demonstrated that historically violent symbols could 
express a true threat that did not give rise to First Amendment protections.  
Hence the display of a burning cross or swastika from a dorm window 
would be a true threat that does not implicate the First Amendment. 
The most difficult issues surrounding university hate speech codes 
concern the much maligned group defamation standard.  Earlier in this 
Article, I presented an argument for the continued constitutionality of 
group defamation statutes.300  A caveat should be added here that Gertz 
qualified Beauharnais: that is, if a private person makes a false public 
statement against an identifiable group, the plaintiff must prove at least that 
the publisher’s conduct was negligent.  The problem in group defamation 
is not of a constitutional nature but of an evidentiary one, because the 
bigger the group of students or faculty whose reputation is attacked, the 
more difficult it is to prove harm to reputation.301  Evidence of hate group 
defamation requires the proof of harm as well as a showing of the previous 
historical impact of false, derogatory statements tending to harm a racial, 
ethnic, religious, gender, nationality, or sexual orientation group. 
Where the defamed group is small enough, no such historical evidence 
is necessary.  For instance, falsely accusing a four-person partnership of 
fraud because they are Jewish is likely to harm each partner’s reputation.  
Even if the statement did not name any of the four, the accusation 
implicates each of them individually as Jews, providing each of them with 
standing to file a lawsuit.  Proving, however, that a false statement made 
against a large group—for instance, purporting that the Holocaust is a hoax 
spread by Jewish students—requires historical proof and will be far more 
difficult to prove.  The person filing a group defamation complaint with 
university authorities would need to show that the content of the statement 
would likely harm the reputation of an established campus organization or 
an identifiable but diffuse group of students or professors.  Proffering 
historical evidence is crucial in the second scenario because, unlike the 
                                                                                                                          
300 See supra text accompanying notes 116–32. 
301 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:  
As a general rule no action lies for the publication of defamatory words 
concerning a large group or class of persons.  Unless the group itself is an 
unincorporated association, as to which see § 562, it cannot maintain the action; and 
no individual member of the group can recover for such broad and general 
defamation.  The words are not reasonably understood to have any personal 
application to any individual unless there are circumstances that give them such an 
application.   
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. a (1977).  The Restatement then asserts that, typically, 
a small enough group to constitute an identifiable class for group defamation purposes involves twenty-
five or less people.  Id. § 564A cmt. b.  Professor Nat Stern argues that the twenty-five-persons 
standard is helpful for distinguishing whether the defendant had a reasonable certainty of the 
statement’s falseness.  Nat Stern, The Certainty Principle as Justification for the Group Defamation 
Rule, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 983–84 (2008).  It seems to me that some of the most noxious forms of 
group defamation, such as Holocaust denial, carry a great certainty of falsehood, probably rising above 
negligence to malice, even though they harm far more than twenty-five people. 
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smaller group example, large-scale group defamation is difficult to link 
directly to the alleged defamatory statement.  I have demonstrated 
elsewhere, through multiple examples, how racism, antisemitism, 
homophobia, xenophobia, and chauvinism have been instrumental for 
organizing hate crimes, rapes, slavery and genocide.302 
Herein lies a paradox: Hate speech is more likely to instigate mass 
crimes and atrocities when it is directed against a large ethnic, religious, or 
racial group, but these complaints will be the least likely to succeed 
because of issues of standing.  Nevertheless, to assure the constitutionality 
of a university group defamation code, university officials can rely on the 
Illinois law upheld in Beauharnais.303  The college code might, for 
instance, prohibit and punish any person or organization that uses 
university facilities to manufacture, sell, advertise, or publish any 
statements, graphics, or electronic communications that dehumanize, 
attribute criminality to, or proclaim the depravity of a class of students, 
faculty members, or college visitors based on their race, ethnicity religion, 
sexual orientation, or gender. 
The weakness with Beauharnais will be one of presenting evidence 
tending to prove that a derogatory statement about a group caused students 
or faculty actual and substantial harm.  European norms recognize that 
history provides ample cases of hate speech instigating violence.  History 
overflows with examples making it clear that propaganda was essential to 
the Nazis’ eventual genocide of Jews,304 the Hutu slaughter of Tutsis in 
Rwanda,305 the Islamist Arab Janjaweed continued mass murder and 
                                                                                                                          
302 Elsewhere, I have developed a number of historical narratives of how supremacist groups rely 
on hate speech to gain support for their movements.  See TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 
26; Alexander Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings of First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Historical 
Perspective on the Power of Hate Speech, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 729, 740–55 (2000) (describing 
historical lessons about hate speech and its consequences). 
303 In Beauharnais, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the following statute:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufacture, sell, or 
offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place in this state 
any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication or 
exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of 
citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication or exhibition 
exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or 
obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots. 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251, 266–67 (1952) (quoting 38 ILL. REV. STAT. § 471 (1949)).  
For a detailed study of the case, see supra Part II.B. 
304 For a detailed discussion on the development of German antisemitism and its influence on 
Nazi politics, see TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 26, at 23–26; see also JOSEPH W. 
BENDERSKY, A CONCISE HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY 141 (2007) (describing Nazi exploitation of 
traditional European antisemitism); EVANS, THIRD REICH, supra note 181, at 27 (describing the 
interrelatedness of historical and modern antisemitism in Germany); SAUL FRIEDLÄNDER, NAZI 
GERMANY AND THE JEWS: THE YEARS OF PERSECUTION, 1933–1939, 3–4, 110, 324 (1997) (discussing 
the integration of European antisemitism in Nazi propaganda and its indoctrinating effect in Germany 
and Austria). 
305 See JEAN HATZFELD, MACHETE SEASON: THE KILLERS IN RWANDA SPEAK 55 (Linda 
Coverdale trans., 2005) (describing radio broadcasts openly calling for Tutsi destruction prior to the 
 
 2010] BURNING CROSSES ON CAMPUS 671 
enslavement of Darfurians,306 the ethnic slaughter during the 2007 Kenya 
election,307 and the Turkish exterminationism perpetrated against 
Armenians.308  Despite indisputable centrality of hate propaganda in mass 
murder and hate crimes, the libertarian strain of American First 
Amendment law denies the potential harm resulting from speech, 
increasing the vulnerability of groups on campus.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
I have argued in this paper that the social and educational value of 
regulating intimidating and defamatory speech on campus outweighs the 
minimal burden it places on speakers.  University hate speech codes raise 
First Amendment concerns that can best be resolved within the framework 
of Supreme Court jurisprudence on free speech.  Public university officials 
aiming to improve campus safety can formulate policies compatible with 
the holding in Virginia v. Black.  That case’s applicability to the campus 
hate speech controversy had been overlooked prior to this Article.  
International conventions and laws on hate speech provide a wealth of 
additional guidance on how to balance the requirements for public safety 
                                                                                                                          
1994 genocide in Rwanda); MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM 
NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 212 (2001) (quoting from the Hutu-power Kangura 
newspaper, which dehumanized the Tutsis and called for their destruction); JOSIAS SEMUJANGA, 
ORIGINS OF RWANDAN GENOCIDE 171–72 (2003) (providing an account of how racist ideology of the 
1950s took root in Hutu politics and permeated the popular view of Tutsis).  
306 Local authorities have periodically paid for the writing and performance of hate songs to 
continue the instigation of the Janjaweed’s most recent onslaught against black African Darfurians.  
According to an Amnesty International report, one song’s lyrics were: 
The blood of the blacks runs like water 
we take their goods  
and we chase them from our area  
and our cattle will be in their land.  
The power of [Sudanese president Omer Hassan] al-Bashir  
belongs to the Arabs  
and we will kill you until the end, you blacks 
we have killed your God. 
Censored Singer Tries To Reform “Hate Singers,” FREEMUSE (June 24, 2008), 
http://www.freemuse.org/sw28705.asp.  This material was originally published in a Washington Post 
video news segment.  A woman’s song went: 
You are gorillas 
you are black 
and you are badly dressed 
Id.  Such lyrics likely soothe the conscience of murderers, rapists, and torturers as they pillage blacks, 
seeking control of Sudan. 
307 Kenyan hate radio programs helped instigate violence between the Kikuyu and Luo peoples.  
Kwamboka Oyaro, The Media Is Not Innocent, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 10, 2008, available at 
http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=41049; Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, Tracing the Roots of 
Ethnic Violence in Kenya (Nat’l Pub. Radio television broadcast Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=18582319. 
308 See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, WORSE THAN WAR: GENOCIDE, ELIMINATIONISM, AND THE 
ONGOING ASSAULT ON HUMANITY 209–10 (2009) (discussing how longstanding Turkish prejudice 
played a central role in the instigation of slaughter against Armenians). 
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against the interests of vitriolic speech.  The policy of each state will 
inevitably be linked to its constitutional scheme, but the nearly universal 
recognition of group defamation should be further reflected in American 
universities’ administration.  Misinformation about the demise of group 
defamation should give way to careful analysis of how that actionable 
category of hate speech has been impacted but not abrogated by the 
elements of public slander. 
Sanctions that punish the intentional dissemination of intimidating 
racist, xenophobic, homophobic, antisemitic, and chauvinistic messages on 
campus do not interfere with constitutionally protected free speech.  Like 
the cross burning statute in Black, campus regulations can prohibit the 
public display of historically threatening symbolism.  College 
administrators need not, however, require proof of intentional intimidation 
because the sanctions available to them are far less onerous than criminal 
penalties.  Negligently placing others in apprehension of harm or asserting 
false facts that damage their reputations can be punished by suspension, 
disenrollment, or withdrawal.  
Restrictions on intimidating and defaming students and university 
employees do not conflict with the university’s mission to openly foster the 
discussion of ideas.  Hate speech is unrelated to the pursuit of truth, and the 
interest in public order justifies reasonable limitations on its dissemination 
on campuses.   
